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COPPING AN ATTITUDE: RULE OF LAW LESSONS
FROM THE RODNEY KING INCIDENT
I. INTRODUCTION
We cannot make events. Our business is wisely to improve them
.... Mankind are governed more by their feelings than by rea-
son. Events which excite those feelings will produce wonderful
effects.1
We started off trying to set up a small anarchist community, but
people wouldn't obey the rules.2
The legal order and system of the United States is founded on the
rule of law. Americans absorb this axiom in junior high civics classes
and, as adults, store it in that part of the brain reserved for trivial pur-
suits, along with world geography and metric conversion tables. As
viewed in other countries, however, this bedrock of our system of justice
is of great importance. Indeed, many nations working to establish "gov-
ernments of laws, not of men" often look to the United States as a
model.'
Perhaps the U.S. legal order's greatest strength is its long tradition
of respect for and adherence to rule of law values. Recent events have
shown, however, that unquestioned adherence to a legal system assumed
to be based on these values can become a dangerous weakness. It can
lead to complacency toward needed change, or worse, blindness to obvi-
ous failures. Relying on a centuries-old presumption of fairness and
equality, citizens may be unaware or disbelieving of the express injustice
their legal system increasingly produces.
The Rodney King incident is a dramatic and painful example of this
problem. On March 3, 1991, the police apprehended Mr. Rodney King
after a high-speed chase. When Mr. King exited the car but failed to
comply with police commands, the police shot him with a Taser and beat
him with batons. Eighty-two seconds of home video captured the en-
1. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992)
(attributed to American revolutionary leader Samuel Adams 1722-1803).
2. ALAN BENNETT, GETTING ON act 1 (1972).
3. See Igor Grazin, The Rule of Law: But of Which Law? Natural and Positive Law in
Post-Communist Transformations, 26 J. MARSHALL L. Rav. 719 (1993); Paul B. Stephan III,
Further Thoughts on the Rule of Law and a New World Order, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 739
(1993); William Webster, The Rule of Law in an Emerging World Order, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 715 (1993).
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counter between Mr. King and the police; it was subsequently broadcast
worldwide. Thus began months of social discord for Los Angeles and
the nation-months filled with tension, fear, outrage, and at times vio-
lence. By now most of the specific criminal justice issues arising from the
incident have been resolved to some degree; however, the larger issues of
systemic injustice remain unanswered.
This Comment suggests that events comprising the Rodney King
incident-the beating, the trials, the civil unrest-send the message that
despite apparent adherence to rule of law values, the current system has
serious flaws that, if left unaddressed, may lead to a breakdown of the
legal order. Consequently, lawmakers, law enforcement personnel, and
citizens should immediately revisit the rule of law roots of our jurispru-
dence so that they have a basis from which to design and implement
necessary changes. To facilitate the process, this Comment first explores
the rule of law ideal-its purpose, function, and the specific values it
embodies4 -placing special emphasis on a rule of law value called the
attitude of legality.' Then it applies a comprehensive rule of law model to
several key events of the Rodney King incident, noting where the ideal
succeeded and where it failed.6 In conclusion, this Comment suggests
alternatives to some of the current practices used within the legal system
that no longer adhere to the rule of law ideal.7
II. RULE OF LAW THEORY
For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are
governed by law; and law exists for men between whom there is
injustice .... This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but
rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own inter-
ests and becomes a tyrant.'
A. Rule of Law: Its Purpose and Function
Several different conceptions of the rule of law ideal have developed
throughout the history of Western societies.9 Despite differences among
4. See infra part II.
5. See infra part II.E.
6. See infra part III.
7. See infra part IV.
8. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 339,
382 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds. & W.D. Ross trans., 1952).
9. See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, in 36 No-
MOS: THE RULE OF LAW 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., forthcoming 1993) (page proofs on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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these conceptions, the fundamental purpose of the rule of law has re-
mained constant: to justify the legal order and legitimize the legal system
of a given society. 10 The rule of law ideal achieves its purpose in several
ways.
First, the rule of law serves as a theoretical blueprint for designing
an ideal legal system. It represents a synthesis of normative values and
processes that is grounded in precepts of natural justice, that promotes
and legitimizes the mechanisms of formal justice, and that is perceived by
those subject to its restraints as producing actual justice.11 Therefore,
perhaps it is better to conceive of the rule of law as a dynamic network of
interrelated, interdependent elements, 12 rather than as a monolith. As
one commentator has suggested, the "rule of law may not be a single
concept at all; rather, it may be ... a set of ideals connected more by
family resemblance than a unifying conceptual structure." 3
Second, the rule of law serves to protect the shared liberty interests
of all members of a society. 4 It does this by establishing a dynamic equi-
librium between power and law.1 5 Pure power is arbitrary might; law is a
system by which institutions channel power so that it "conform[s] with a
people's values and established patterns of expectation."1 6 Neither
10. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 41-42. The legal order is a composite of specific rights
and duties subject to the coercive force of the sovereign or state. See JOHN RAWLs, A THE-
ORY OF JuSTIcE 240 (1971). "It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-ordered society the
coercive powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social coopera-
tion." Id. This order is implemented by a complex of positive laws, agency regulations and
orders, enforcement mechanisms, and administrative procedures that constitute the legal sys-
tem. See id. "The role of an authorized public interpretation of rules supported by collective
sanctions is precisely to overcome [the] instability [inherent in voluntary agreements]." Id.
11. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 1, 3. This sentence refers to three "types" of justice.
"Natural" justice is a moral concept of universal equality and fairness that exists independent
of particular human social ordering. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 382-83. "Formal" jus-
tice is justice achieved by adherence to the principle of equality or by obedience to a particular
system. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 58. As such, it is a political conception ofjustice. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11 (1993). A formal justice system that is based on the rule
of law can incorporate notions of natural justice as fundamental precepts. See RAWLS, supra
note 10, at 238-39; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 382 ("Of political justice part is
natural, part legal-natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by
people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been
laid down is not indifferent .... ."). The third type ofjustice, "actual" justice, is defined by this
Author as the sum of results produced by a given legal system as perceived by the citizens
subject to that legal system's coercive power.
12. WALKER, supra note 9, at 46-48 (describing rule of law as "dynamic equilibrium"); see
infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
13. Solum, supra note 9, at 121.
14. See RAwLs, supra note 10, at 239-40.
15. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 1, 47; infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
16. WALKER, supra note 9, at 1.
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power nor law alone will lead to a stable society. 17 As ends in them-
selves, power is coercive and unpredictable, and law can become inflexi-
ble and hence potentially oppressive.' Without rule of law values to
regulate the tension between these antagonistic forces, the dominance of
one over the other would likely lead to serious infringement or curtail-
ment of individual liberty. 19
Finally, the rule of law is a part of and offers support for the larger
network of systems that comprise the social order.2" Social order is a
complex of interrelated normative and descriptive systems that reflects-
through social custom and politically determined rules-shared notions
of justice, governance, politics, economics, and group and interpersonal
relationships.21 The primary function of social order is to accommodate
the tension, inherent in all human activity, between the common good
and the individual good, between obedience to the general will and pur-
suit of free will.22 A legal system based on rule of law values will en-
courage maximization of common good by promoting certainty, fairness,
and equality in social arrangements. At the same time, it will protect
17. Id
18. Id
19. See iL
20. "The rule of law is not a complete formula for the good society, but there can be no
good society without it." Id. at 42.
21. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 11. Rawls uses the term "basic structure" to refer to the
less precise "social order." See id "By the basic structure I mean a society's main political,
social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social
cooperation from one generation to the next." Id.
22. Rousseau was one of many to ponder this tension. His conclusion was that the two
were irreconcilable. JULES STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT 84
(1978). Thus, Rousseau set out to describe a form of government in which the individual,
when obeying the law, was in essence following his or her own free will. Id. His thesis on the
social contract was an attempt to lay the foundations for this type of self-governance by con-
sent. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in 38 GREAT
BooKs oF THE WESTERN WORLD 387 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds. & G.D.H. Cole trans.,
1952).
"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with
the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before " This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the
solution....
... [E]ach man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is
no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over
himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for
the preservation of what he has.
Id. at 391.
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individual autonomy by deterring behavior that impinges on a person's
liberty interests.
23
In light of the rule of law's overarching purpose and function, the
network-of-ideals approach provides the best normative and descriptive
explanation of how the theory shapes a legal system, and how it fits the
legal order within the larger social order. Thus, a comprehensive rule of
law theory will combine the ideals of natural justice and the mechanisms
of positive justice with notions of interrelation, fluidity, and balance. Be-
cause many conceptions of rule of law theory fail to account for this mix
of values, rules, and flexibility, they have limited practical usefulness. A
brief overview of several different conceptions of rule of law theory will
illustrate this fact and help underscore the value of the network-of-ideals
approach.
B. The Constitutional Principle: Popular American Variant of the
Rule of Law
The idea of the rule of law is bred in the bone for most U.S. citizens.
Its origins date back to the foundations of democratic political thought.24
The common shorthand for this conception of rule of law theory is that a
free people are those governed by "the rule of law, not of men."25 Along
these same lines, a "government under law' 26 has been commonly under-
23. See the discussion of Rawls's rule of law conception infra notes 74-92 and accompany-
ing text, and Walker's twelve-point definition infra part II.D.
24. See, eg., ARISTOTLE, Politics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, supra
note 8, at 439. See generally WALKER, supra note 9, at 93-127 (describing early development
of rule of law from Athens to English colonies of North America); Ellis Sandoz, Fortescue,
Coke, and Anglo-American Constitutionalism, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA,
ANCIENT CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF THE RULE OF
LAW I (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY] (tracing roots of liberty,
inseparably entwined around concept of rule of law, from medieval Europe to eighteenth-
century revolutionary America).
25. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 24, at 485.
Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over.., a city which
consists of equals, is ... contrary to nature .... And the rule of law, it is argued, is
preferable to that of any individual.... Therefore he who bids the law rule may be
deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element
of the beast ....
Id.
26. This phrase is attributed to John Adams. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
381 (15th ed. 1980) (noting that phrase latter incorporated in Massacuhusetts Constitution,
first appeared in tract printed under Adams's pseudonym in Boston Gazette in 1774).
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stood as synonymous with "rule of law."27 Thus, the rule of law has
developed into an essential principle of constitutional democracy.2"
This iteration of the rule of law ideal provided the basis upon which
the founders of the United States chose to reject a monarchy and to cre-
ate a revolutionary system of self-government among equals operating
under a written constitution. 29 As a political tool, it has been used
grandly to justify the separation of powers3" and intimately to offer an
equitable remedy for an injured plaintiff.31 Additionally, it has lent sup-
port for the proposition that government not only must operate through
the positive law, but also must be subject to its power.
This popular American variant of the rule of law reduces it to a
constitutional truism that is far too limiting.32 First, it only focuses on
part of the rule of law ideal: rule of law as a tool of popular sover-
eignty.33 Although the rule of law is an integral part of constitutional
democracy, it has value to citizens on a more intimate level. It has a
27. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 2-3. Other common catch phrases that define the rule
of law as a political theory are: "free government .... liberty under law, Constitutional and
representative government, [and] republicanism." Sandoz, supra note 24, at 4.
28. See THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY, supra note 24, passim; WALKER, supra note 9, at 1-2.
29. Webster, supra note 3, at 715. For example, in Common Sense Thomas Paine pro-
claimed, "let a day be solemnly set apart... that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in
absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there
ought to be no other." THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
THOMAS PAINE 23, 49 (1969). Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
begin with reference to the foundational self-governing importance of the rule of law. See U.S.
CONST. pmbl. ("WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice ...."). The Declaration of Independence states:
That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed;.., it is the right of the people... to
institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
30. For a state example, see MASS. CONST. art. XXX.
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers of either of them: the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be
a government of laws and not of men.
Id. On the federal level, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
31. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49. In order to reach his more momentous holding later
in the opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall first had to justify the Court's power to furnish the
disappointed Marbury some sort of remedy, and hence its jurisdiction to even consider the
case. He relied on the rule of law. "The government of the United States has been emphati-
cally termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high
appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Id. at 59.
32. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 2.
33. See id. at 2-3.
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juridical component that can guide the development of rules and proce-
dures by which specific conflicts are resolved in a way that is generally
perceived as just. Second, this conception is a chauvinistic perspective
that history refutes. Other nondemocratic forms of government, such as
theocracies, monarchies, and communist systems, can also operate in ac-
cord with the rule of law ideal.34 Finally, if the rule of law is viewed
solely as a concept of constitutionalism, it will rarely contribute much to
contemporary legal discourse in a mature constitutional government.
Thus, there must be more to the rule of law if it is to be significant and
relevant to the way modem Americans order their lives.
C. The Juridical Principle: Legal Conceptions of the Rule of Law
A number of legal philosophers consider the rule of law solely as a
component of positivist legal theory. This is largely due to the immense
influence of the work of A.V. Dicey, a legal positivist greatly influenced
by the Austinian35 school of classical positivism.36 Dicey's tripartite ap-
proach-a homage to sparse Austinian methodology 37-- has dominated
discourse on the subject.38 He posited his conception of the rule of law as
follows:
"That 'rule of law,' then, which forms a fundamental principle
of the constitution, has three meanings, or may be regarded
from three different points of view.
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or pre-
dominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbi-
trary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part
34. Id. at 1, 12-13; cf Grazin, supra note 3 (discussing species of rule of law, albeit flawed,
that existed in Soviet Union); infra note 47 (debating whether rule of law existed in Nazi
Germany).
35. "Austinian" positivism is the brand of positivism made famous by the Englishman
John Austin (1790-1859), founder of English analytical jurisprudence. See RICHARD A.
COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY, VICrORIAN JURIST 23 (1980). He is
remembered for his seminal work regarding the command-of-the-sovereign doctrine as well as
the separation theory of law and morality. The command-of-the-sovereign doctrine holds that
law is that which is publicly articulated by a sovereign and habitually obeyed by those persons
subject to the coercive power of that sovereign. Id at 24. Austin's separation theory holds
that what the law is and what the law ought to be are two separate and distinct inquires. Id. at
23. This was a direct response to natural law theory, which he believed led to the unnecessary
confusion of legal and moral questions. Id at 24.
36. Id. For a summary of Austin's influence on Dicey, see id. at 23-28.
37. Dicey was most influenced by Austinian methodology. Id. at 24. This methodology is
characterized by reducing a subject to a few principles of undoubted validity, and building a
comprehensive body of knowledge through the analysis of pertinent cases. See id. at 24-25.
38. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 128.
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of the government.... [A] man may with us be punished for a
breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else.
It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal sub-
jection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land adminis-
tered by the ordinary law courts... [and] excludes the idea of
any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience
to the law.., or the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals ....
... [L]astly, [it] may be used as a formula for expressing
... that with us the law of the constitution.., are [sic] not the
source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as de-
fined and enforced by the courts... thus the constitution is the
result of the ordinary law of the land."39
Since the turn of the century, Dicey's theory and the rule of law
generally have been attacked and discredited on a number of grounds.
40
One critic has labeled positivist formulations of the doctrine-with their
emphasis on the positive law and its pedigree4'-the "rule-book" concep-
tion.42 An oft-noted criticism of this conception of the rule of law is that
it strictly bifurcates the legal system into the procedural and substan-
tive-never the twain shall meet.43 This separation allows a legal system
with immoral substantive laws to justify them by instituting processes
that apparently operate in accord with rule of law procedural values.'
39. Id. at 129 (quoting ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW
OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-03 (10th ed. 1960)).
40. For a discussion of the "century of criticism" inspired by Dicey's theory, see id. at
128-39.
41. "Pedigree" is shorthand for the more complex notion H.L.A. Hart calls the rule of
recognition. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961). This rule embodies the
fundamental principles accepted by government officials and citizens as the necessary criteria
of validity by which a rule becomes law in a given legal system. Id.
42. Ronald Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law, in 64 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRITISH ACADEMY 259, 261 (1978).
[The rule-book approach] insists that, so far as is possible, the power of the state
should never be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance with rules
explicitly set out in a public rule book available to all. The government as well as
ordinary citizens must play by these public rules until they are changed, in accord-
ance with further rules about how they are to be changed, which are also set out in
the rule book.
Id. at 261-62.
43. Id. at 262.
[Tihose who have this conception of the rule of law do care about the content of the
rules in the rule book, but they say that this is a matter of substantive justice, and
that substantive justice is an independent ideal, in no sense part of the ideal of the
rule of law.
Id
44. This criticism is part of the general attack leveled against the separation theory, which
is at the core of positivist thought. See supra note 35.
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January 1994] RULE OF LAW
As examples, consider the "law-state" of Nazi Germany'5 or the whole-
sale importation of German racial law, despite a constitutional prohibi-
tion to the contrary, into Vichy France.' These legal systems produced
laws that were certain, general, and public, and had been validated by
appropriate government participation-legislatures enacted the laws and
independent courts and lawyers interpreted and applied them.47 Yet the
content of these laws was substantively corrupt because it sanctioned ra-
cial and ethnic discrimination. South African apartheid-legitimatized
by positive and common law4 -- is a recent example of this kind of cor-
ruption of the rule of law 9 that is only now being remedied.50
Since Dicey, some have narrowed the positivist approach to formal-
ist extremes by equating the rule of law to a law of rules.5" Indeed, this
cramped approach has lead some jurists to believe the rule of law is noth-
45. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 5.
46. See, eg., Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 27 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 285, 292-300 (1993).
47. Whether National Socialist Germany actually operated a rule of law legal system has
been the subject of debate. Compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 617 (1958) (arguing that as reprehensible as content of Nazi
law was, it was still law, duly enacted and enforced) with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 630, 650-51 (1958) (arguing that many
Nazi laws were "secret" and many judges and lawyers were under duress "from above" to
interpret laws favorably for government so that system did not produce law). Pursuant to
Walker's comprehensive twelve-point definition of the rule of law, see infra part II.D., these
types of laws would violate rule of law values of certainty, generality, and equality. See
WALKER, supra note 9, at 25. Perhaps the example of Vichy France offers a clearer illustra-
tion of rule of law values being used to legitimize an immoral legal system. See the discussion
of enactment and legal interpretation of racial laws even stricter than those of Nazi Germany
in Richard H. Weisberg, Legal Rhetoric Under Stress" The Example of Vichy, 12 CARDozo L.
REV. 1371 (1991); Weisberg, supra note 46, at 292-300.
48. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 53-106
(1978).
49. See DAVID DYZENHANS, HARD CASES IN A WICKED LEGAL SYSTEM vii-ix, 49
(1991).
50. MARINA OTTAWAY, SoUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ORDER (1993).
51. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A govern-
ment of laws means a government of rules. Today's decision... is ungoverned by rule, and
hence ungoverned by law."). The focus of Justice Scalia's article concerns judicial discretion
and "the dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion within the narrow context
of law that is made by the courts." Scalia, supra, at 1176. His thesis is that judges, when
deciding particular cases, should strive to develop general rules so that judge-made law can
take on the rule of law values of legislatively enacted laws: equality, publicity, and predictabil-
ity. See id. at 1178-80. So highly does he regard the empowering constraints of the rule (book)
of law ideal that he states "[there are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all."
Id. at 1179. Unfortunately, he fails to give us any rule as to when that time would be.
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ing more than "law and order.' 5 2 In the popular media, the rule of law
is often employed in this way to denounce criminal behavior or social
upheaval.5 3 This simplistic view, however, has been widely repudiated. 4
Another school of thought inculcates its conception of the rule of
law with social, political, and moral principles that place requirements
on the substantive content of the law. This approach to the doctrine has
been called the "rights" conception.55 The Declaration of Delhi56 is an
example of this approach. It reads in part: "[T]he Rule of Law is a
dynamic concept... not only to safeguard and advance the civil and
political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish
52. DUGARD, supra note 48, at 43; see, ag., ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 58-59 (1968).
This may seem harsh [to be sent to prison for defying laws that mandate racial
discrimination]. It may seem especially harsh if we assume that I profoundly believe
that the law I am violating is immoral and unconstitutional .... But this is what we
mean by the rule of law ....
... The state, the courts, and the individual citizen are bound by a set of laws
which have been adopted in a prescribed manner, and the state and the individual
must accept the courts' determinations of what those rules are and mean in specific
instances. This is the rule of law, even if the ultimate judicial decision is by the
narrow margin of five to four!
Id
53. E.g., Carol Morello, Rule of Law Returns to War-Torn Streets, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 13, 1992, at C3 (reporting that rule of law has returned to Beirut because former mili-
tiamen now spend their time issuing traffic tickets); Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Force Contains
Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A20 (quoting report issued by special commission
headed by William Webster: "'[T]he first priority for law enforcement must be to re-establish
an understanding that the rule of law still governs society.' "); Karen Tumulty, U.S. Crime
Rate Dips but Violent Offenses Climb, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at Al (quoting FBI Director
Louis J. Freeh: " ' [C]rime is shockingly high in a country where the rule of law should
prevail.' ").
54. See, eg., HOwARD ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 8-27 (1968).
[S]ome mystical value has been attached to "the rule of law", beyond those human
rights which law, way back in our democratic tradition, was set up to support....
Until American citizens can overcome this idolization of law, until they begin to see
that law is, like other institutions and actions, to be measured against moral princi-
ples, against human needs, we will remain a static society in a world of change, a
society deaf to the rising cries for justice-and therefore, a society in serious trouble.
Id. at 23.
55. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 262.
[The rights conception] insists that these moral and political rights be recognized in
positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens
through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is
practicable. The rule of law.., is the ideal rule by an accurate public conception of
individual rights.
Id
56. The Declaration of Delhi, along with detailed conclusions and proceedings, was pub-
lished in a report by the International Commission of Jurists, which met in New Delhi, India
in 1959. The Commission, which had 185 members, consisted of judges, practicing lawyers,
and law professors from 53 countries. INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF
LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1959).
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social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which his
legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized.""7
Criticisms of the rights approach .focus on describing why rule of
law theory is ill-equipped to manage any real control over the substantive
content of the laws within a given system.58 A commonly noted weak-
ness is that the rights approach presupposes that citizens have moral
rights prior to the positive enactment of those rights.5 9 Many legal phi-
losophers believe that the notion that citizens have rights outside of those
bestowed on them by the positive law makes no sense at all." Further-
more, defining the nature and scope of human rights-whether bestowed
by law or by a higher source-is a difficult and perilous task.61 Thus,
reaching consensus on what those rights are is extremely difficult, and
deciding how to resolve differences of opinion is even more so.62 Witness
the turmoil surrounding the debate over a woman's right to choose abor-
tion in the United States-a country fairly unique in that it expressly
recognizes and protects an individual's inalienable rights through a writ-
ten constitution "with an entrenched Bill of Rights."'63 Thus, one of the
jurists in Delhi argued that if fundamental rights were to be part of a
universally accepted rule of law system, they should be limited to "nega-
tive rights"-freedoms from rather than freedoms to."
A third juridical conception of the rule of law has been called the
"institutions-principles-procedures" approach.6" This approach begins
with the assumption that the rule of law exists to some greater or lesser
57. IL
58. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 6.
59. See Dworkin, supra note 42, at 263.
60. Id.
61. See id
62. See id
63. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 10.
64. See INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JuRISTS, supra note 56, at 65. This negative free-
doms approach was implicitly sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against
unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of cer-
tain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. To hold otherwise would
mark a drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution. It cannot be be-
cause government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives... government, there-
fore has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have
financial resources to obtain contraceptives ....
Id. at 318; see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 797 (1985) ("As it has evolved in the decisions of this Court, the freedom recognized
by the Court in Roe v. Wade and its progeny is essentially a negative one .... ") (White, J.,
dissenting).
65. WALKER, supra note 9, at 14.
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degree in all common-law jurisdictions, as well as in countries where the
individual enjoys rights and remedies similar to those enjoyed by citizens
of common-law countries.6 6 Thus, by examining the principles underly-
ing the particular legal institutions in a given country, one can determine
the extent to which the rule of law ideal is operative.67 For example,
civil-law countries use the "inquisitorial" approach in criminal trials,
whereas common-law countries use the "accusatorial" approach.6
Though they employ different methods of discovering the truth, both ap-
proaches share the common goal of providing a fair and open trial to the
accused. 9 Therefore, the underlying principle requiring open, impartial
tribunals is an integral part of both legal systems, and both can be said to
operate pursuant to the rule of law.70
In developing this conception of the rule of law, then, the question
becomes: What principles are of such importance that they must be pres-
ent to some degree in some kind of institution or procedure? A require-
ment of minimum substantive content can prevent grotesque parodies of
the rule of law, as seen in the examples of Nazi Germany and Vichy
France. The difficulty, however, is to limit these principles carefully to
avoid the philosophical and political problems inherent in the rights con-
ception. 71 Thus, the foundational normative principles required for the
rule of law must be minimalist-just those necessary to prevent the legal
system from enacting the letter of the rule of law, while trampling its
spirit.
72
What then is the basis for these minimalist normative principles?
Professor John Rawls's theory of justice73 provides some insight. Ac-
cording to Rawls, the minimal substantive content necessary to maintain
the rule of law ideal is that required to ensure "[t]he regular and impar-
66. Id. at 10. Walker justifies this "starting point" by saying: (1) the rule of law must be
meaningful since it has been the subject of debate in common-law countries for centuries; (2)
writers in noncommon-law countries have noted that the rule of law concept is present in
common-law countries; and (3) even critics of rule of law theory say that it exists in common-
law countries. Id
67. Id at 10-11.
68. Id at 11.
69. See id
70. See id Whether these different approaches are equally effective in furthering the un-
derlying purpose-open, impartial tribunals-is a separate inquiry. Id.
71. See INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 56, at 65; WALKER, supra note
9, at 5-6.
72. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 5-6. Professor Walker offers a few, specific minimal
"rights" implicit in this approach: the presumption of innocence, the presumption against
retroactive legislation, the right to legal representation, and the right to a fair, speedy, and
public trial. Id. at 5.
73. For a detailed discussion of Rawls's theory of justice, see RAWLS, supra note 10.
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tial, and in this sense fair, administration of the law."'74 This notion is
part of a more comprehensive conception of political justice Rawls refers
to as "justice as fairness."75 The rule of law exists when a legal system
has incorporated the fundamental precept of fairness, which Rawls iden-
tifies as "formal justice."76 There are four general precepts of formal
justice-normally associated with the "principle of legality"-that will
be present in "any system of rules which perfectly embodie[s] the idea of
a legal system."77 In brief, these are: (1) "ought implies can"; (2) "simi-
lar cases [must] be treated similarly"; (3) there is no offense without a
law; and (4) natural justice values should be used to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process.78
A legal system79 is necessary to the function of a well-ordered soci-
ety's formal system of equal liberty."0 The parameters of liberty are
established by equal individuals" negotiating a social contract from the
"original position."8 2 These negotiations result, in part, in the develop-
74. Id. at 235.
75. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 11; RAWLS, supra note 10, at 12. "The aim ofjustice as
fairness, then, is practical: it presents itself as a conception of justice that may be shared by
citizens as a basis of reasoned, informed and willing political agreement." RAWLS, supra note
11, at 9.
Thus, justice as fairness starts from within a certain political tradition and takes as its
fundamental idea that of society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one
generation to the next. This central organizing idea is developed together with two
companion fundamental ideas: one is the idea of citizens (those engaged in coopera-
tion) as free and equal persons; the other is the idea of a well-ordered society as a
society effectively regulated by a political conception of justice.
Id. at 14 (internal references omitted).
This, however, does not mean that justice and fairness are the same. It means only that
the principles of justice a social groups adopts "are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair."
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 12.
76. Id at 235.
77. Id at 236.
78. Id. at 236-39. These values mirror those identified by Walker. See infra note 107.
79. Rawls defines a legal system as "a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational
persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social
cooperation." RAWLS, supra note 10, at 235.
80. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 35. "When [a legal system's] rules are just they establish
the basis for legitimate expectations.... If the [rules] are unsure, so are the boundaries of
men's liberties." RAWLS, supra note 10, at 235.
81. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 14. Equality, in this context, means the equal distribution of
basic rights and duties. Id This fundamental principle is one of two Rawls identifies in his
theory and is significant to the rule of law discussion. The second fundamental principle holds
that unequal distribution of wealth or power among members of a society can be justified only
if those inequalities benefit the least advantaged members of the society. Id at 14-15.
82. The original position is one in which individuals operate behind a "veil of igno-
rance"-that is, they have no perception of their unique individuality. Id Because these indi-
viduals are ignorant of their social status, talents, intelligence, wealth, strength, and the like,
these characteristics do not color their negotiations. Id As such, the veil of ignorance is the
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ment of a formal system of equal, shared liberty.83 Liberty is defined
generally as freedom, or lack thereof, from constraints to do or not do a
thing. 4 A "formal system"" is comprised of constitutional and legal
constraints that are binding upon all citizens equally, thereby forming
the boundaries of individual liberty.16 In any given society, the formal
system of equal liberty is represented by "a certain structure of institu-
tions, a certain system of public rules defining rights and duties."18 7
Rawls contends that rational citizens will want to maintain the rule
of law because it is the best way to protect their equally shared liberty:
"To be confident in the possesssion [sic] and exercise of these freedoms,
the citizens of a well-ordered society will normally want the rule of law
maintained."88 Additionally, the rule of law provides a process for or-
ganizing cooperative enterprises. 9 Furthermore, the rule of law ideal
can be an instrument for measuring the justness of a society's legal or-
der." Rawls states, however, that the rule of law can only go so far to
determine the existence of justice in a particular social order.91 Unlike
adherents of the "rights approach," Rawls contends that the rule of law
can only guarantee the "impartial and regular administration of rules,"
and is a weak constraint to substantive injustice in the rules themselves. 92
Despite their differences, all these legal conceptions of the rule of
law theory couple juridical principles with constitutional principles such
as those discussed in the previous section.93 The addition of juridical
principles makes the rule of law a tool for describing and guiding the way
people order their everyday lives, even in a mature constitutional democ-
absence of special interests. The only thing we assume about these individuals is that they are
rational and mutually disinterested-that is, they do not take an interest in one another's
interests. Id at 13. Thus, the agreements reached ensure that "no one is advantaged or disad-
vantaged in the choice of principles .... Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to
design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a
fair agreement or bargain." Id at 12.
83. See id at 11-12, 203.
84. Id at 202.
85. Rawls notes that there are informal systems that affect liberty, such as public opinion
and social pressure. See id However, for rule of law purposes, it is only the formal system of
liberty that is of importance.
86. See id
87. Id
88. Id at 240.
89. See id at 236.
90. See id
91. See id
92. Id. The rule of law being used to justify National Socialist Germany's implementation
of the Holocaust is a striking and horrific example of this proposition. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
93. See supra part II.B.
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racy such as the United States. Therefore, in order to be relevant to a
modem democratic society, a comprehensive definition of the rule of law
should encompass both constitutional and juridical principles. However,
it should provide only minimum content to the substantive law by adher-
ing to basic, broadly conceived principles that can be achieved by imple-
menting procedure within public institutions. This would prevent
resistance to the rule of law from citizens faced with "the fact of reason-
able pluralism,"' 94 as in the United States. Furthermore, the definition
should contain specific detail so that it can be used to measure, in a prac-
tical and concrete manner, whether a particular system is protecting the
equal liberty promised to all members of a society.
D. A Comprehensive Definition of the Rule of Law
Geoffrey de Q. Walker's book, The Rule of Law,95 develops a com-
prehensive twelve-point definition of the rule of law that embodies both
juridical and constitutional ideals and recognizes that a rule of law sys-
tem must contain both substantive and procedural elements. Thus,
Walker's theory adopts an institutions-principles-procedure approach.
Hence, like Rawls's conception of the theory, it strikes a reasonable and
cautious balance between the positivist rule-book approach and the so-
cial, political, and moral consciousness of the rights approach. However,
unlike Rawls's approach, it attempts to identify with greater precision
the specific substantive values and procedural components that should be
present, at least to some degree, in all rule of law systems. Additionally,
Walker offers an interesting explanation as to how these elements
interact.
Walker envisions the rule of law as "a principle of the legal organi-
zation of human affairs." 96 He states that
[i]t is more a statement of constitutional and juridical principle,
a juristic reserve, an idea of profound legality superior, and pos-
sibly anterior, to positive law .... [I]t manifests itself more as
an absence than a presence, rather like those other great nega-
tives, peace and freedom. It imports an attitude of restraint, an
absence of arbitrary coercion by governments or other individ-
94. For Rawls, the "fact of reasonable pluralism" is a fact of life in modem democratic
societies. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at xvi. He defines the fact of reasonable pluralism as "a
plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive [philosophical, religious, or moral]
doctrines." Id This clash of values "is the normal result of the exercise of human reason
within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime." Id
95. WALKER, supra note 9.
96. Id at 23.
January 1994]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:675
uals or groups.... [It is a] philosophy of legal restraint and
fairness... that may be hard to encapsulate in statutory lan-
guage, but it is equally hard to stamp out by overt action.97
Walker builds his definition upon two normative foundations: (1)
Both people and governments should be ruled by the law and obliged to
obey the law; and (2) the law should be such that people are willing and
able to be guided by it.98 He then constructs a twelve-point definition of
the rule of law:
1. Substantive laws exist that prohibit private coercion;99
2. The government is subject to the substantive laws;"°
3. The substantive law should possess characteristics of cer-
tainty, generality, and equality;1°1
4. Mechanisms are in place that ensure that the content of the
laws remains reasonably consistent with social values; 2
5. Laws against private coercion are enforced; 03
6. Government action in accordance with the law is subject to
oversight and enforcement;"
97. Id at 3.
98. Id at 23.
99. Id at 24. The primary purpose of the rule of law is to protect the individual from
general lawlessness and anarchy. Id
100. Id "The government must be bound by substantive law, not only by the constitution,
but also as far as possible by the same laws as those which bind the individual." Id.
101. Id at 25. This requires that the positive laws "should be specific about what they
prohibit, [and] they should not particularize the subjects to whom they apply." Id. These
normative characteristics condemn ambiguous laws that empower judges and law enforcement
officials to deal arbitrarily with citizens. Id Professor Solum would add another term to the
normative characteristics required of the positive law-publicity. Solum, supra note 9, at 122.
"The laws should be known and expressly promulgated; no criminal penalties should be im-
posed for violation of rules that are not announced in advance." Id. Although this require-
ment has a certain appeal, anyone familiar with legal research will wonder whether laws
generally receive the publicity required to make them "known" to the ordinary citizen. Per-
haps the oft-quoted maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse," combined with the constitu-
tional and statutory procedural requirements of law and rule promulgation, which can then be
reviewed in hindsight by courts, are enough to satisfy Professor Solum's publicity requirement.
102. WALKER, supra note 9, at 27. These mechanisms can take a variety of forms depend-
ing on the source of law-statutory, common law, or custom. See id In theory, the California
ballot initiative system, which can be used to amend even the state constitution, is an example
of one of these mechanisms. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3500, 29710
(West 1989); WALKER, supra note 9, at 27.
103. WALKER, supra note 9, at 28. This means that the machinery of law enforcement and
adjudication should be efficient and timely. See id
104. Id at 29. This requires that there be procedures and institutions that can resolve
disputes between the government and its citizens. Id The constitutional power of the federal
courts to review legislation and executive action is an example of this rule of law value. See id.
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7. The judiciary is independent; 10 5
8. Members of the legal profession are independent;1 °6
105. Id Professor Walker states that "[a]n independent judiciary is an indispensable re-
quirement of the rule of law." Id
"The argument for the independence of the judge is that in performing his function
of rule-interpretation he should not be subject to pressure that would cause him to
vary the meaning of the rules to suit the views of the persons affected by them, and
that in ascertaining 'facts' he will not be influenced by considerations of expediency.
It is an essential element in the maintenance of that stability and predictability of the
rules which is the core of constitutionalism."
Id. at 30 (quoting M.J.C. VILE, CONSTrruTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERs 329
(1967)). In fact, the United States Constitution has explicit guarantees to ensure that the fed-
eral judiciary remains independent. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (federal judiciary is ap-
pointed, not elected, by President with "advice and consent of the Senate"); id. art. III, § 1
(federal judges have lifetime appointment "during good behavior," and cannot have their com-
pensation reduced).
Probably everyone would agree that the judiciary should be independent; however, in the
current political climate of the United States, the debate has recently centered on the issue of
how much independence is enough. Thus, the fight is not over who but whatpolitical ideology
will wear the robes. See, eg., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLrr-
ICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 267-336 (1990) (describing as "Bloody Crossroads" his nomi-
nation, and subsequent defeat by Senate vote for appointment to Supreme Court).
The battle was ultimately about whether intellectual class values, which are far more
egalitarian and socially permissive, which is to say left-liberal, than those of the pub-
lic at large and so cannot carry elections, were to continue to be enacted into law by
the Supreme Court. That was why this nomination became the focal point of the war
within our culture.
Id. at 337.
In California, the tug-of-war of politics and the bench is even more pronounced. Superior
court judges are elected and subject to recall. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16; CAL. ELEC. CODE
§§ 27000-27346 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993). This puts judges at the mercy of factions who
disapprove of the outcomes in particular cases and can get the required signatures on a peti-
tion. See, eg., Sheryl Stolberg, Petitioners Fail in Bid to Recall Karlin, L.A. TIMES, July 8,
1992, at B3 (describing recall attempt resulting from unpopular sentence imposed by judge).
Additionally, California appellate and supreme court justices, after their initial appointment,
are subject to mandatory periodic confirmation votes. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 16; CAL. ELEC.
CODE §§ 27000-27346. Thus, if particular judges have rendered unpopular decisions, the elec-
torate can remove them from the bench. E.g., John Balzar, Justice Bird's Recall Becoming
Epic Battle, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1985, at Al (describing multimillion dollar campaign to
remove Chief Justice Rose Bird and four other associate justices from California Supreme
Court because of their reputations for being soft on convicted criminals). "At stake is the
future of the state's judiciary, the rule of law, the safety of the streets and the conscience of
California-in short, crime and justice." Id (emphasis added).
Is a judiciary subject to multimillion dollar recall campaigns ever truly independent? And
if not, is the rule of law a nullity in California? Walker would answer that the notion of
"independence" is one of degree, and that a lessened independence for the judiciary could be
offset by other rule of law values within the system. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying
text.
106. WALKER, supra note 9, at 36. Thus, during those times when the independence of the
judiciary might be compromised, the bar can remind the bench to adhere to the rule of law
ideals. Id. at 36-37.
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9. Tribunals exercise impartiality by the incorporation of
"principles of natural justice"; 07
10. Courts remain actually accessible to all whose legal rights
have been impinged;1 8
11. Discretionary powers vested in law enforcement and other
government agencies are exercised in a way that is honest, im-
partial, and does not pervert the law; 109 and,
12. The people possess the attitude of legality.' 10
These rule of law elements contain both substantive values and pro-
cedural components."' The first four elements establish substantive
standards for the laws themselves." 2 As broad, overarching standards,
they do not burden the theory with the task of enumerating various spe-
cific rights, and hence, should avoid most political and philosophical con-
troversies. Indeed, these substantive requirements offer only minimal
protection from unjust laws. Presumably, other systems in the social or-
der will exist to shape the specific content of laws. The rule of law ele-
ments five through eleven set standards for the "adjective law, or the
machinery for the implementation and administration of the law."' 13
Professor Walker admits that his comprehensive model of the rule
of law contains what appear to be inherent contradictions. 4
On the one hand, [the rule of law] speaks of the need for cer-
tainty and stability in the law so that people will be able to plan
and organize their arrangements in accordance with it; but on
the other hand, it stresses the need for the law to retain some
flexibility and to be capable of adapting itself to changes in pub-
lic opinion. It asserts a requirement of generality of application
in the law, together with its corollary of equality before the law;
on the other hand, it cautions that the principle of equality
107. Id at 37. These principles are: (1) requirement of unbiased tribunals; (2) opportunity
for both sides to be heard; (3) courts open to the public, including the media; and, (4) in
criminal proceedings, the presumption of innocence for an accused. Id.
108. Id at 40. Adequate access to the courts ensures that injured parties have a genuine
ability to vindicate their legal grievances. Thus, a system that is prohibitively expensive and
encourages undue delay defeats this rule of law value. See id. The present civil justice system
may be perilously close to violating this rule of law value. Cf. WALTER K. OLSON, THE
LIrGATION EXPLosION (1991) (detailing expense, delay, and ultimate frustration for parties
involved in civil litigation).
109. WALKER, supra note 9, at 40.
110. Id. at 41; see infra part II.E.
111. WALKER, supra note 9, at 28.
112. See id
113. Id.
114. Id. at 42.
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should not apply to cases in relation to which valid distinctions
may or should be drawn. Again, it is said that an essential con-
dition of the rule of law is the independence of the judiciary,
but at the same time we do not want judges to be too independ-
ent, lest the rule of law degenerate into judicial tyranny. I15
Walker reconciles these contradictions by adopting what he de-
scribes as a "Taoist viewpoint" to the rule of law ideal. 116 For the Taoist,
the "universe is engaged in ceaseless motion and activity, in a continual
cosmic process... called the Tao-The Way."' 17  The Tao is manifest
in the cyclical "dynamic interplay [between] two archetypal poles, which
are associated with many images of opposites taken from nature and
from social life."' "18 Yin" 9 and yang 20 represent the conceptualization
of these dynamic, polar opposites. 12  However, the notion of opposites in
Taoist philosophy is quite different from the notion of opposites in tradi-
tional Western thought. 22 Opposites are not two separate and adverse
things, but are merely different aspects of the same whole. 123 In the ulti-
mate extension of Taoist thought, opposites are the same.' 24 Thus, the
Tao, or Way, is not the sum of yin and yang, "but the regulator of their
alternation." 125
Walker believes that the rule of law is not "a pure concept, fully self-
consistent" but is a means of achieving a "dynamic equilibrium" between
115. Id.
116. See id at 47.
117. FRrrjoF CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT:. SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE RISING CUL-
TURE 37 (1982).
118. Id at 35.
119. "f1jin corresponds to all that is contractive, responsive and conservative." Id. at 36.
120. "Jang implies all that is expansive, aggressive, and demanding." Id
121. Id at 35. The following are examples of yin and yang:
Yin Yang
Earth Heaven
Moon Sun
Night Day
Winter Summer
Id at 36. There is no moral value associated with eitheryin oryang. Id The Taoist notion of
the good is the "dynamic balance" between yin and yang; the bad is "imbalance." Id.
Symbolically, yin and yang are represented by a circle made up of two complementary
swirling shapes: one white, one black. WALKER, supra note 9, at 46. Each swirl has a dot of
the opposite color within it. Id "These dots symbolize the notion that even in its pure form,
each force already contains the seed of its own opposite." Id
122. See CAPRA, supra note 117, at 35.
123. Id
124. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 44-49.
125. Id at 46.
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"pure law and pure power." 12 6 Thus, a fluid model of the rule of law
discovers the Tao between the yin of "disorder" and the yang of "good
government." '127 If the rule of law does not contain within it "some of its
own opposite, it will never enjoy stability.""2 8 Therefore, while all the
elements in his comprehensive definition must be present in a rule of law
system, the degree to which any one element is prominent will be bal-
anced by the degree to which it interacts with other elements. 29 For
example, a system that has a judiciary subject to election and recall-less
of an independent judiciary (point seven)-may balance itself by provid-
ing the public the ability to more readily amend its constitution by ballot
initiatives--more of the mechanisms that ensure the law reflects current
social values (point four). 3 ' "Preserving the rule of law thus becomes a
function, not of imprisoning power, but of preventing the power element
from growing so large as to overwhelm law .... 131
E. The Attitude of Legality
"MIhe health and strength of the rule of law does not ultimately
depend on the efforts of lawyers, judges or police, but on the attitudes of
the people." 132 This notion is embodied in the twelfth point of Walker's
definition: the attitude of legality. No other element in Walker's defini-
tion is as imbued with the yin and yang of his conception as the attitude
of legality. It is both substantive-the content of the legal system must
somehow "feel" right-and procedural-the legal system's administra-
tion is subject to the public's perceptions of its ability to produce justice.
The attitude of legality is simultaneously outside the institutional system
because it originates and resides in the people subject to the system, and
inside the institutional system because it evaluates and guides the system
itself. Exercise of the attitude of legality is both cause-shaping the sub-
stance and procedure of the legal order-and effect-being shaped by the
legal order's substance and procedure.
The attitude of legality is a slippery concept to grasp. Professor
Walker recognizes that it defies precise definition, yet he makes some
126. Id. at 47.
127. See id at 46-47.
128. Id
129. Id
130. Refer to the discussions of California law supra notes 102, 105. The Author offers this
example for illustrative purposes only, and reaches no conclusion whether the appropriate
balance is in fact struck in California's legal order.
131. WALKER, supra note 9, at 46-47.
132. Id at 41.
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attempt to do So. 13 3 He refers to the attitude of legality as the "spirit" in
the legal system, the "ghost in our machine" of formal justice.13 4 "The
rule of law has a dimension offeeling that does not fit into the framework
of constitutional and legal concepts. But since feeling is the spring to
human action, this dimension is what gives those concepts their practical
force." 135 Accordingly, the other eleven points are in the service of the
attitude of legality, thus making it the "essential prerequisite" of the en-
tire legal, constitutional, and social order. 136  Without this attitude, peo-
ple will not exhibit fidelity to the law, the result of which is a state of
anarchy.1
37
Unfortunately, Professor Walker's explanation does not advance
comprehension of the attitude of legality very far. What is the "dimen-
sion of feeling" that serves as the content for the attitude of legality?
And how does tapping into this dimension fuel the engine of a rule of law
legal system? By answering these questions, one may better understand
the primacy of the attitude of legality in Walker's comprehensive concep-
tion of the rule of law.
1. Content of the attitude of legality
An "attitude" is defined as a
[r]eadiness for attention, or action, of a definite sort. A mental
attitude is thus a motor or attentive DISPOSITION which rep-
resents a definite, relatively independent, and conscious
function.
... Mentally, it is a state of the attention primarily, and
secondarily an expression for habitual tendencies and
interests.. 13
Furthermore, "[a] mental attitude is always directed towards something
in mind."
' 139
133. Unfortunately, Walker's brief discussion is more metaphor than analysis. See id 41-
42.
134. Id Perhaps, a similar notion is present in Rawls's theory of justice in his discussion of
civil disobedience. The terms Rawls uses are a "sentiment ofjustice" or "community's sense of
justice." RAwLS, supra note 10, at 386-87 (emphasis added); see infra note 295 and accompa-
nying text.
135. WALKER, supra note 9, at 41 (emphasis added).
136. Id
137. See id.
138. 1 DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 88-89 (James M. Baldwin ed.,
1957) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY DICTIONARY].
139. Id. at 89.
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The existence of a mental attitude implies that some cognitive activ-
ity has taken place within the individual, facilitating a choice of belief or
action towards a given object. As applied to Walker's attitude of legality,
citizens exercise choice by holding a belief or acting volitionally based
upon how they perceive the law. Thus, the dimension of feeling must be
capable of providing sufficient information to allow individuals to form a
disposition towards the object-in this case, the law-and to manifest
that disposition in an act, or tendency to act-namely, adhering to or
disregarding the law. The term "feeling," however, is imprecise. There-
fore, the following is an attempt to isolate the dimension of feeling that
can best provide content to the attitude of legality.
a. sensation
One common definition of "feeling" is the faculty by which one per-
ceives sensate impressions, such as feelings of physical pain, heat, or
brightness."4 Using this notion to define feeling, the attitude of legality
would spring from the dimension of sensation. This does not fit, how-
ever, with Walker's conception of the rule of law. For the law to affect
the individual, its content must be understood to some degree; it must be
able to promote enlightened public opinion."' 1 Generally, understanding
is a more complex form of mentation than that which can be acquired
through the senses. Human activity grounded in sensate impression is
reflexive, not cognitive. 42 Therefore, the sensory definition of feeling
should be rejected because comprehension of law and intentional human
action in regard to the law are not consistent with sensory information
and reflexive action. Thus, smelling the law or tasting the law are absurd
ideas, and merely hearing the decision in a case or seeing the words of a
statute will not produce comprehension or underlie an informed voli-
tional act.
b. passion
Another common understanding of feeling is an "emotional state,"
or "passion." First, a distinction between emotion and passion must be
drawn."4 3 "Emotion" is a long term affective state of consciousness "in-
140. NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 359 (deluxe ency. ed.
1981) [hereinafter NEw WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY].
141. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 41.
142. See PHILOSOPHY DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 515. "Sensation" is defined as
"[t]hat mode of consciousness which can only be accounted for by the present operation of an
external stimulus upon the nervous system, or some equivalent condition." Id.
143. What constitutes an emotion, and how it is separate from a passion, or emotional state,
is a subject discussed in great depth in both psychological and philosophical works. For a
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volving a distinctive feeling-tone [examples of which are joy, fear, sor-
row, love, anger] and a characteristic trend of activity aroused by a
certain situation."'" A "passion" is a compelling, intense, and transient
experience of a feeling-tone.'45 The following are offered as illustrations
of this distinction: If love is the emotion, ardent affection is the passion;
if agitation of the mind is the emotion, violent anger is the passion; if fear
is the emotion, sheer terror is the passion.
The dimension of passion would mean a rule of law system creates
in citizens a regard for law that is based on compulsion of a feeling-tone.
The fact of compulsion negates the idea of choice that is implicit in the
formation of an attitude. Additionally, passion's transient and impulsive
qualities would undermine ideas of certainty, fairness, and equality-
three central tenets of the rule of law. Even substantive law recognizes
the limits passion places on comprehension and volition. For example,
the law treats a homicide committed in the "heat of passion," man-
slaughter, differently from murder. The law recognizes that had the indi-
vidual been given time to reflect, his or her actions might have been
different. Absent reflection, which affords choice of belief and action,
one cannot truly form attitude. Therefore, passion cannot be the "di-
mension of feeling" to which Walker refers.
c. emotion
Defining "feeling" as "emotion" offers the best possibility for pro-
viding content to the attitude of legality. According to one school of
thought, an emotion is a long-term affective state of consciousness, in-
volving a particular feeling-tone, that "occurs at some stage of a motiva-
tional process."' 14 This process is described "as the process of
apprehending something as desirable or undesirable and then taking
steps to acquire it or to avoid it, or at least having a tendency to do
so."1 47 Thus, experiencing an emotion leads or tends to lead to a goal-
directed endeavor. 148 This motivational theory of emotion seems to com-
port best with Walker's conception of the attitude of legality because he
quick overview, see 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 479-86 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to resolve this debate;
however, based on the minimal criteria discussed in the text of this Comment, there appear to
be some ways to distinguish the two.
144. PHILOSOPHY DICrIONARY, supra note 138, at 316.
145. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 143, at 479.
146. See id. at 480.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 481.
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believes that "feeling is the spring to human action."' 49 Therefore,
Walker's dimension of feeling can be identified as the dimension of
emotion.
However, this does not completely describe the content of the atti-
tude of legality. In order to further explore its scope, the next inquiry
should be what feeling-tone or group of feeling-tones provides the moti-
vational basis of emotion that forms this attitude toward the legal order.
Several feeling-tones are offered as possible candidates.
"Fear" has been an oft-mentioned emotional motivator, particularly
in positivist theories. Simply stated, fear of the coercive power of the
sovereign or state fosters an attitude of legality in the people, and the
deterrent effect of enforcement and punishment is considerable. 50 Yet
when speaking of a public attitude toward an entire legal order, fear is
probably inadequate to explain the entire relationship between citizens
and a rule of law system.' 5'
Modem positivists admit that most legal systems will have laws of
command, like the criminal law, and laws of relationship, such as the law
of contracts or wills. 152 While fear of disobeying a command and suffer-
ing the punishment may explain the attitude toward laws of command, it
does not explain the attitude toward laws of relationship. No one fears
the efficient breach of a contract. The law will not punish this breach; it
merely exacts compensation in order to protect the parties' bargained-for
benefit. Some even argue that the law should, and does, reward economi-
cally efficient transgressions." 3 Furthermore, obedience to laws of com-
mand are not necessarily predicated upon fear of punishment. Many
people refrain from murder and robbery because they believe them im-
moral, regardless of the positive law's command. All things considered,
fear alone is an inadequate emotional basis for an attitude of legality.
"Reverence" or "faith"-more refined emotions-may provide the
requisite dimension of emotion to form an attitude of legality. Immanuel
Kant wrote about the "[r]espect for the law, which in its subjective as-
pect is called moral feeling."' 5  Reverence-respect wearing a moral
overcoat-arises from the concept of duty, which is inherent in the
law. "'55 The observation or transgression of this duty will generate "plea-
149. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 41.
150. See Hart, supra note 47, at 604-05.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 90-96 (4th ed. 1992).
154. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 256 (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
155. IdL
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sure or pain of a distinctive kind" which he called "moral feeling." '56 A
similar notion is expressed by Lon L. Fuller as "fidelity to law."' 57 Fi-
delity-"the careful and exact observance of duty" 15 ---arises in one who
is faithful to the object of one's belief.159 Faith in the law is grounded on
the inherent morality of the law itself." For Fuller, the law's inherent
morality is founded upon rightness of order; 161 for Kant, it is based upon
rightness of duty.
The primary problem with reverence or faith is that they require a
threshold belief that the positive law is necessarily moral. This could
prove problematic for positivist lawyers-adherents of separation the-
ory-and natural lawyers-who do not believe that positive law is neces-
sarily moral, or for that matter, necessarily law at all. Reverence or faith
may require a theoretical leap too controversial for many legal philoso-
phers on either side of the nature of law debate.
Perhaps "respect" provides the least controversial motivational feel-
ing-tone to describe the attitude of legality. Respect is a related notion to
reverence and faith, but as developed here is grounded in political con-
tractarian theory, not moral values. John Rawls's theory of justice pro-
vides three reasons for engendering this feeling of respect for the rule of
law.
The primary reason is based upon Rawls's political concept of "jus-
tice as fairness." 162 Laws and procedures163 are arrived at by the negoti-
ations of free and rational people.'" "[T]hose who engage in social
cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to
assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social ben-
156. Id. at 48.
157. Fuller, supra note 47.
158. NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 140, at 362.
159. See id.
160. Fuller, supra note 47, at 644-48.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
163. The words "laws" and "procedures" have been substituted for Professor Rawls's
words "institutions," see John Rawls, The Justification for Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL Diso-
BEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 240, 241 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969), and "princi-
ples," see RAWLS, supra note 10, at 11. His understanding of institutions and principles would
be inclusive of both laws and procedures. Institutions is a more narrow term: "[A]n institution
[is] a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities, and the like." Id. at 55. Principle is much broader: those fundamen-
tals of fairness that people pursuing their own interest, unencumbered by self-knowledge of
their specific circumstances, would agree as being fair. Id. at 11-12. Hence, substituting
"laws" and "procedures" for Professor Rawls's "institutions" or "principles" is consistent
with his core thesis, and more accurate for the purposes of this discussion.
164. See RAwLs, supra note 10, at 12, 236.
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efits."'16  Once these principles of justice are agreed to, a legal system is
developed to protect and maintain them. 166 Therefore, respect for the
law is fostered by the notion of consent: The legal system's intrinsic fair-
ness is the result of mutually agreed principles of justice selected and
consented to by those subject to the law. Put another way, citizens re-
spect their own handiwork.
167
Professor Rawls's contractarian theory offers two additional reasons
for engendering respect for the law. He asserts that citizens, as partici-
pants in a beneficial and reciprocal agreement, have a natural duty as
well as a social obligation to honor the social contract. 16  One's natural
duty is to not oppose establishment of just and efficient laws and proce-
dures, and to comply with and uphold them once established. 169 One's
social obligation is based on the familiar contract law doctrine of mutual-
ity. Assuming an individual has knowingly benefitted from these laws
and procedures and has imposed expectations on others to fulfill their
part of the bargain, the individual is then obliged to do what he or she
has agreed to do when the time for performance arrives.' 70 In this man-
ner, law promotes just and efficient social interaction, and provides equal
benefits to all individuals subject to the legal order. Therefore, rational
people would feel respect for the law because it is in their best interests-
as individuals and as group members.
This Comment neither intends nor desires to identify any one spe-
cific motivational feeling-tone as definitive of any individual's or group's
attitude of legality. This exercise is merely suggestive of the more prob-
able feeling-tones that can provide sufficient content. In reality, Walker's
dimension of emotion likely consists of a combination of these feeling-
tones, and others not discussed. How individuals experience and per-
165. Id at 11.
166. See id. at 236-37; supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
167. Although this Comment employs Rawlsian theory to explain the feeling of respect for
the law, the notion of respect for the law as being founded on political contractarian principles
has long been recognized as part of the democratic experience in the United States.
[I]n the United States everyone is personally interested in enforcing obedience of the
whole community to the law; for as the minority may shortly rally the majority to its
principles, it is interested in professing that respect for the decrees of the legislator
which it may soon have occasion to claim for its own. However irksome an enact-
ment may be, the citizen of the United States complies with it, not only because it is
the work of the majority, but because it is his own, and he regards it as a contract to
which he is himself a party.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 256-58 (Phillips Bradley ed. & Henry
Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1973) (1840).
168. Rawls, supra note 163, at 241.
169. Id.
170. Id
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ceive the legal order, how these experiences and perceptions translate
into particular feeling-tones, and how these feeling-tones interact, take
priority, and shape dispositions for certain behavior in the individual or
group of individuals are all important inquiries beyond the scope of this
Comment. 171 How the attitude of legality functions within a rule of law
system, however, should be briefly addressed.
2. Function of the attitude of legality
The attitude of legality-the tendency, motivated by a single feeling-
tone or a combination of several feeling-tones, to obey the parameters set
by the legal order-serves three essential functions. First, it helps form
the bond between the "beneficiaries" of a legal system-the public-and
the "fiduciaries" of that legal system-police, judges, legislators, and
other government officials. This bond helps ensure that the public will
affirm and obey unpopular decisions and tough rules: "For unless the law
can command obedience, there is no legal system .... The values,
expressed in the first eleven elements of Walker's model,1 73 are designed
to produce rules and procedures that citizens will perceive as generally
promoting justice.
Second, the attitude of legality operates as a feedback mechanism in
a legal system. The public is constantly getting information from the
"fiduciaries" of a legal system via statutes, regulations, and case law.
The attitude of legality, measured by objective manifestation of public
sentiment, provides valuable feedback to the "fiduciaries" as to whether
the "beneficiaries" perceive the legal order as able to deliver actual justice
through the formal justice system. If the "fiduciaries" are sensitive to
this feedback, they can maintain the public's trust in the system by ad-
justing the legal order to reflect an evolving society's needs.
Third, the attitude of legality, or more accurately its absence, serves
as a warning device that indicates failures in a legal system. This func-
tion is especially important when the system is suffering from hard-to-
detect, yet serious, defects. In this respect, the attitude of legality oper-
ates like a canary in a coal mine. It provides a prophylactic mechanism
171. There are many external influences that go into the formation of attitudes. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1991) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK]. One section of this publication is entitled Public Attitudes Toward Crime and
Criminal Justice-related Topics. Id. at iii. Much of this attitudinal information is broken out
according to the survey respondent's race, age, gender, education, religion, income, politics,
place of residence, and region of the country. See id. at 171-254. There are measurable differ-
ences in how members of these subcategories respond to specific questions.
172. WALKER, supra note 9, at 41.
173. See supra part II.D.
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by which a legal order, which "on its face" justifies itself by apparent
adherence to rule of law values, can have its hidden injustices exposed.
For instance, a large number of citizens may begin to exhibit a "bad"
attitude toward the law, or an attitude of lawlessness. This group may
perceive the law and its administration negatively because it has exper-
ienced the legal system in an adverse way different from other citizens.
This can occur when a particular group is routinely subjected to the de-
terrent or retributive forces of a legal system. Regardless of whether this
discrimination is de jure or de facto, it destroys the fundamental rule of
law values of equality, fairness, and impartiality. Therefore, the group's
resistance to the legal system, or its "bad" attitude of legality, provides a
mechanism that should awaken a sense of injustice in fellow citizens.
From this sense of injustice, citizens can explore, and hopefully correct,
the disparate adverse impacts to which the affected group objects. Fail-
ure to make this inquiry, however, will likely lead to the spread of the
loss of respect for the law, as more and more members outside the origi-
nally affected group begin to feel the failure of the legal order.
III. THE RODNEY KING INCIDENT AND THE RULE OF LAW
This Comment suggests that the U.S. legal system is the type of
legal system referred to in the preceding section: It is a system that "on
its face" appears to embrace the rule of law, yet produces an increasing
number of results that are perceived, especially by certain ethnic and ra-
cial groups, as unjust. This is particularly true in the criminal justice
arena. The Rodney King incident illustrates this problem. The remain-
der of this Comment details some of the key events surrounding the
arrest of Rodney King and the state trial of the police officers charged
with overzealous enforcement of the law, and examines whether the rule
of law was either advanced or defeated by the legal system's response to
these events. Then, it proposes two alternative practices to the system's
current operations-practices more in tune with rule of law values.
A. The Beating
ED. [Fire Department] Hold, hold on, give me the address
again.
P.D. [Police Department] Foothill & Osborne, he pissed us off,
so I guess he needs an ambulance now.
ED.: Oh, Osborne. Little attitude adjustment?
P.D.: Yeah, we had to chase him.
ED.: OH!
P.D.: CHP and us, I think that kind of irritated us a little.
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F.D.: Why would you want to do that for?
P.D.: (laughter) should know better than run, they are going to
pay a price when they do that. 174
1. The facts
On March 3, 1991, at approximately 12:40 a.m., a call went out over
the police band that a high-speed chase was underway on the Foothill
Freeway.17 The California Highway Patrol (CHP) reported that a sus-
pect was erratically driving a Hyundai clocked at 110 to 115 miles per
hour. 176 Shortly after this transmission, Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) Officer Laurence Powell and rookie Officer Timothy Wind
joined in the pursuit as the LAPD's primary response car.1 77 LAPD
Officers Theodore Briseno and Roland Solano, driving toward the scene,
were designated the secondary pursuit car. 7 ' From his post at the Foot-
hill LAPD station, Sergeant Stacey Koon announced over the radio that
he too would respond to the felony in progress.
179
By 12:50 a.m. a LAPD unit transmitted a "Code 6," meaning that
the pursuit had ended. 1s0 It ended at the intersection of Osborne and
Foothill Boulevards in Lakeview Terrace.1"1 A total of twenty-three of-
ficers, consisting of LAPD, CHP, and Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
trict Police,18 2 ten patrol cars, and a helicopter were present at the end of
the pursuit.18 3 Using his loudspeaker, CHP Officer Timothy Singer or-
174. INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 14-15 (1991) [hereinafter COM-
MISSION] (quoting transcript of fire and police dispatchers' radio-transmitted conversation con-
cerning request for assistance for Rodney King after his encounter with police).
175. See id at 4; Jim Newton, Koon Says King Defied Efforts to Subdue Him, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1993, at Al, A21.
176. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 4. There is controversy about this fact because some
believe Hyundais are incapable of going more than 100 m.p.h. Id
177. Id
178. Id at 5.
179. Newton, supra note 175, at A21. Sergeant Koon said that he needed to be on the scene
when the pursuit ended so that he could fulfill his duties as field sergeant. Id "I wanted to
catch up with the pursuit and involve myself in it and take control." Id.
180. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 4.
181. Id
182. Because racial animus is an issue in this incident, it is interesting to note the racial
make-up of the officers present at the scene. The group consisted of two African-Americans-
a male and female-four Latino males, two caucasian females, and 15 caucasian males. Id. at
11.
183. Id. at 5. At least twelve of these officers arrived after the "Code 4" was transmitted.
Id. A Code 4 "notifies all units that 'additional assistance is not needed at the scene' and
indicates that all units not at the scene 'shall return to their assigned patrol area.'" Id. (quot-
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dered all the occupants out of the car. 184 The two passengers immedi-
ately exited the car and assumed the "prone-out" position on the
pavement. 85 Following "felony stop" procedure, the two men were
handcuffed and guarded at gunpoint. 18 6 At some point after the passen-
gers complied, Rodney King, the driver, exited the Hyundai. 87 An Afri-
can-American male, standing six feet, three inches tall and weighing
roughly 225 pounds, emerged from the tiny import.18 8 It was at this time
that Sergeant Koon arrived on the scene.189
Upon seeing Mr. King, Sergeant Koon reported that he "'felt
threatened, but felt enough confidence in his officers to take care of the
situation.' "190 Not only was Mr. King "big and muscular," but Sergeant
Koon believed he might be on PCP. 19 1 Once outside his car, Mr. King
seemed "'disoriented and unbalanced.' "192 Mr. King stared blankly
into space, an indication, according to Sergeant Koon, that he was under
the influence of PCp.193 In addition, Mr. King waived at a police heli-
copter overhead, shook his buttocks at the officers, and did "'a little
dance.' "194 Indeed, Mr. King later admitted to drinking alcohol earlier
that evening.
1 95
ing 4 L.A. POLICE DEP'T, LAPD MANUAL 289). Most of these latecomers did not have a
reason to be on the scene other than idle curiosity. See id,
184. Id. There were three people in the vehicle: Mr. King, the driver, and his passengers,
Bryant Allen and Freddie Helms. Id. at 7.
185. Id. at 7. The "prone-out" position is lying flat, face down on the ground. See id.
186. Id. at 5.
187. The speed with which Mr. King complied with the police order to exit his car was
another contested fact. Sergeant Koon and Officer Powell claimed that Mr. King initially
refused. Id. at 5-6. Furthermore, once Mr. King did get out of the car, he refused to follow
directions and went back inside. Id at 6. Mr. King has always maintained that he tried to
follow the police commands, but they were being shouted at him in a manner that confused
him. See id.; Jim Newton, 7 Was Just Trying to Stay Alive,' King Tells Federal Jury, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1993, at Al, A16. One of the passengers in Mr. King's car, Bryant Allen,
told investigators that Mr. King did immediately respond to the police command to exit, but
having failed to unbuckle his seatbelt, was pulled back inside his car. COMMISSION, supra note
174, at 6.
188. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 6.
189. See Newton, supra note 175, at A21.
190. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 6 (quoting LAPD Internal Affairs Report).
191. Id. PCP is shorthand for a powerful and popular street drug called phencyclidine.
PCP is a particularly frightening drug because of its propensity to imbue some of its users with
a type of psychosis that can produce violent tempers, hallucinations, and an immunity to pain.
See JAMES C. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES 82-83
(1978).
192. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 6 (quoting LAPD Internal Affairs Report).
193. Newton, supra note 175, at A21.
194. Id. (quoting Sergeant Koon's testimony during federal trial).
195. Newton, supra note 187, at A16.
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Mr. King was ordered to lie prone on the ground, but instead, got
down on all fours and slapped the ground.196 Sergeant Koon ordered his
officers to handcuff Mr. King.'9 7 Several officers swarmed Mr. King and
pulled his arms out from under him, causing him to slam face first onto
the pavement. 198 As they attempted to handcuff him, Mr. King testified
that his arm was being twisted, and the resulting pain caused him to yell
and fiinch. 199 Mr. King said that this startled the officers so that they
jumped off of him.2" As Sergeant Koon saw it, the suspect suddenly
threw "'800 pounds of officer off his back.' "201 Officer Powell reported
that Mr. King rose up from the ground, almost knocking him down.2"2
Now "'100 percent"' convinced that Mr. King was on PCP and
dangerous, Sergeant Koon shouted to his officers to stand back and shot
Mr. King twice with a Taser.2°3 Sergeant Koon reported that the suspect
did not respond to either firing of the Taser.2° Another officer on the
scene reported that the Taser had some effect because Mr. King shook
and yelled for almost five seconds.20 5 Mr. King later testified to his reac-
tion: "'When I got shocked, it just felt like my blood was boiling inside
me.... I just kind of laid down and took it. I was hoping it would go
away shortly.' "206
Meanwhile, across the street in a darkened apartment, George Hol-
liday was sleeping, his new video camera recharging in the living
room.2"7 The commotion of sirens, flashing lights, and helicopter blades
thumping the night air woke Mr. Holliday up and drew him to the win-
Blood and urine samples taken from King five hours after his arrest showed that his
blood-alcohol level was 0.075%, indicating that at the time of his arrest, he was over
the level (0.08%) at which one can be presumed intoxicated under California law.
The tests also showed "traces" of marijuana (26 mg/ml), but no indication of PCP or
any other illegal drug.
COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 8.
196. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 6.
197. Newton, supra note 175, at A21.
198. Id.
199. Newton, supra note 187, at A16.
200. Id.
201. Newton, supra note 175, at A21 (quoting Sergeant Koon's testimony during federal
trial).
202. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 6.
203. Id. (quoting LAPD Internal Affairs Report). A Taser is a gun-like device that uses an
electric shock to temporarily immobilize suspects who are physically resisting arrest. See
Newton, supra note 187, at A16.
204. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 6.
205. Id.
206. Newton, supra note 187, at A16 (quoting Mr. King's testimony during federal trial).
207. Steve Padilla et al., Cameraman's Test Puts Him in the Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1991, at B1.
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dow.2°8 He looked out just in time to see Mr. King shot with the
Taser.2°  He raised the video camera to his eye and pushed "record."'21
As Mr. King was shaking off the effects of the Taser,211 he thought
he heard an officer yell, "' "We're going to kill you nigger. Run." ' "212
He rose up to run away. As Mr. King moved towards Officer Powell,
Officer Powell stuck Mr. King with his baton.213 Mr. King fell back to
the ground immediately; Officer Powell hit him several more times.214
While Sergeant Koon yelled "that's enough," Officer Briseno moved in
to stop his fellow officer.215 Then Mr. King rose to his knees, and Of-
ficers Powell and Wind struck him again.2 6
Despite repeated "power strokes" from the officers' batons, Mr.
King "apparently continued to try to get up."1217 The officers continued
to strike Mr. King because they interpreted his subsequent movements as
either threats of violence or expressions of defiance.218 Mr. King said
any moves he made were to protect his head and body from the barrage
of blows and kicks.219 Finally, after fifty-six baton blows and six kicks,
Mr. King was subdued.220 He was then hog-tied, with handcuffs and
cordcuffs, and left on the ground for several minutes before being loaded
into an ambulance and driven away.2 21
208. Id
209. See id "'By the time I got the camera on they were hitting him, and I just happened
to get the action,' Holiday said." Id.
210. See id
211. See Newton, supra note 187, at A16.
212. Id. (quoting Mr. King's testimony during federal trial). However, upon both direct
and cross-examination, Mr. King admitted that he is not "absolutely" sure that these racial
epithets were used, and that he made conflicting statements regarding them on a number of
occasions. See Jim Newton, King Admits Lies but Insists That He Didn't Hit Officers, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al, A18. The infamous videotape provides little help.
On May 7, 1991, Los Angeles public television station KCET broadcast an "en-
hanced audio" version of [the video]. According to KCET, the enhanced video indi-
cates that as King is being beaten, an officer is yelling "nigger, hands behind your
back-your back." An audio enhancement done for the Los Angeles County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, on the other hand, was described as "inconclusive."
COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 8.
213. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 7.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Newton, supra note 175, at Al, A21.
219. Newton, supra note 187, at Al.
220. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 7.
221. Id. at 7-8.
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Mr. Holliday captured the last eighty-two seconds of Mr. King's
encounter with the police in blurry black and white.222 The next day,
March 4, Mr. Holliday called the Foothill LAPD station advising them
that he had witnessed a violent encounter involving a motorist and the
police. 23 The desk officer expressed his disinterest by failing to ask for
the details of the event Mr. Holliday had witnessed.224 Mr. Holliday did
not tell the LAPD he had the videotape.225 Later that day, Mr. Holliday
contacted Los Angeles television station KTLA, which broadcast the
video that night.226 CNN got hold of a copy, and in a matter of days it
was replayed over and over again throughout the world.2 27
Condemnation of the event was swift, coming from all sectors of
society. The immediate reaction from LAPD Chief Daryl Gates was
that the tape was "shocking," but that he would reserve his judgment
until the incident was investigated.22 1 Mayor Tom Bradley was "out-
raged" by what he saw, stating that "'this is something we cannot, and
will not tolerate.' "229 President George Bush publicly stated that the
conduct depicted in the video was "sickening. ' 230 Polls taken in the
weeks following the incident indicated that Los Angelenos, of all races
and ethnicities, believed that this kind of "street justice" was commonly
practiced by the LAPD.231
2. The rule of law violated
Police brutality motivated by racial animus is an egregious violation
of point eleven of Walker's rule of law definition. Point eleven states that
law enforcement must exercise its discretionary powers in a way that is
honest and impartial, and does not pervert the law. The use of reason-
222. See Padilla et al., supra note 207, at B1.
223. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 11.
224. Id
225. Id
226. Id Mr. Holliday sold the tape to KTLA for $500. Padilla et al., supra note 207, at
B1.
227. See Padilla et al., supra note 207, at B1.
228. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 12.
229. Id. at 12-13 (quoting Mayor Tom Bradley).
230. Id at i.
231. Id at 16. According to a Los Angeles Times poll conducted March 7-8, 1991-three
days after the initial broadcast of the incident--63% of Los Angeles city residents, including a
majority of whites, felt that incidents of police brutality were "common." Id. Two weeks
later, a poll asking the same question received a similar response-68% of Los Angeles resi-
dents saying police brutality was "very common" or "fairly common." Id. This second poll
was broken down by race: Fifty-nine percent of the Caucasian respondents, 87% of the Afri-
can-American respondents, and 80% of the Latino respondents said police brutality was either
"very common" or "fairly common." Id.
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able force is a discretionary power granted to police in order to prevent
imminent harm to themselves and others, or to coerce suspects to submit
to arrest.232 If prejudice towards an individual on account of race or
ethnicity, or personal hostility at the suspect's obstinate defiance, is at the
root of an officer's use of force, that officer has violated the impartiality
and honesty requirements of point eleven. There is no justification ever
for police to use unreasonable force in a rule of law legal system. Thus,
the image of four police officers beating a prone man, while a score of
other officers watched, appeared to most viewers as though the police
were not only violating the positive law, but were flaunting their disdain
for the rule of law.
3. The rule of law system responds
Official action was immediate; it served the rule of law value embod-
ied in point six: Government action in accordance with the law is subject
to oversight and enforcement. By March 6, three days after the incident,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Los Angeles District At-
torney's Office, the LAPD Internal Affairs Department, and the Police
Commission had begun investigations of the matter.233 Soon thereafter,
the United States Attorney General's Office began to investigate whether
232. The grant of this discretionary power is part of most states' positive law. For example,
the California Penal Code provides:
Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force to effect the arrest,
to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.
A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or
desist from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the per-
son being arrested; nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to
self-defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest or to prevent escape or
to overcome resistance.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a (West 1985).
Additionally, local police authorities in written policies and guidelines define in some de-
tail what constitutes "reasonable force." For example, the LAPD uses the following policy
statement:
In a complex urban society, officers are daily confronted with situations where con-
trol must be exercised to effect arrests and to protect the public safety. Control may
be achieved through advice, warnings, and persuasion, or by the use of physical
force. While use of reasonable physical force may be necessary in situations which
cannot be otherwise controlled, force may not be resorted to unless other reasonable
alternatives have been exhausted or would clearly be ineffective under the particular
circumstances. Officers are permitted to use whatever force that is reasonable and
necessary to protect others or themselves from bodily harm.
COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 26. Officer training teaches that the suspect determines the
amount of force that is "reasonable and necessary" under the circumstances. Id. "As the
suspect escalates or de-escalates his or her level of resistance or aggressiveness, the officer must
react accordingly." Id
233. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 13.
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any federal criminal civil rights laws were violated.2 34 Many of the sev-
enteen LAPD officers at the scene were either transferred from the Foot-
hill Division or subject to disciplinary action, and a shake-up of the
Foothill Station command hierarchy occurred.235 Furthermore, in re-
sponse to the public outcry that racial bias and police brutality were sta-
tus quo throughout the LAPD, Mayor Tom Bradley empaneled the
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department.2 36 Its
mission was to probe the concerns regarding excessive force under color
of law, especially in dealing with minority individuals.237
While reports were being compiled, the District Attorney's Office
brought state criminal charges against four officers. Sergeant Koon and
Officers Powell, Briseno, and Wind were charged with multiple violations
of the California Penal Code. Count I alleged criminal assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury;2 38 Count II alleged criminal assault
by a public officer who, under color of authority, beats a person without
lawful necessity;2 39 Counts III and IV, charges against Powell and Ser-
geant Koon respectively, dealt with filing false police reports; 24 and,
Count V charged Sergeant Koon as an accessory after the fact to the
criminal assaults charged in Counts I and U1.241
These indictments served the rule of law in three substantial ways.
First, they supported the point-six value: Government is subject to the
coercive power of the law. Although these police officers had discretion-
ary power to use force against Mr. King, they still are subject to judicial
scrutiny of their exercise of that power to ensure it did not cross the line
into criminal conduct. Second, they supported the point-two value: The
234. See id Because the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office quickly brought charges
against four officers, the federal investigation was suspended so as not to interfere with local
authorities. The federal investigation resumed, however, within hours of the state court not-
guilty verdicts. See Jim Newton, How the Case Was Won, L.A. TIMES MAG., June 27, 1993,
at 10.
235. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 13.
236. See id. at ii.
237. Id "The principal purpose of this Report is to present the results of our efforts to
understand why and how often this authority has been abused, and to offer some down-to-
earth recommendations for avoiding a repetition of incidents like that involving Rodney
King." Id. at iii. In order to arrive at this understanding, the Independent Commission inter-
viewed more than 50 experts, 150 community representatives and private citizens, and 500
current and retired LAPD officers, and reviewed more than one million pages of documents.
Id A staff of 60-plus lawyers assisted by three data-analysis firms worked 100 days to produce
this self-described "blunt report." Id. at i-iii.
238. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 1988).
239. Id. § 149 (West 1988).
240. Id § 118.1 (West Supp. 1993).
241. Id § 32 (West 1988).
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substantive content of the law delimits government action. Four of the
five counts dealt with substantive criminal laws that specifically prohibit
intentional acts committed by law enforcement officials. Third, the swift
official action taken supported the point-twelve value: the attitude of le-
gality. Heeding the outrage in the African-American community and the
shock of citizens at large, this quick and decisive action was intended to
restore public confidence in the formal justice system. Furthermore, the
tragic event gave rise to heightened public awareness. Minority groups'
longstanding problems with the criminal justice system were now dra-
matically impressed on the majority's sense of justice.242
B. The Jury
[The jury's] chief value is that it applies the "law"... in an
earthy fashion that comports with justice as conceived by the
masses, for whom after all the law is mainly meant to serve. The
general verdict is the answer from the man on the street. 243
1. Change of venue
Shortly after their arraignment, the four officers moved for a change
of venue. 2' They argued that the daily coverage of the "resultant
events" flowing from the incident-in print and on radio and television-
and the palpable prejudice against the LAPD throughout the city made it
impossible for them to seat an impartial local jury.24 The trial court
denied the motion, but the state appellate court granted the writ of man-
date and remanded the matter to the trial court to choose a new site
"where a fair trial can be held." 2" The court of appeal ordered the
change of venue because "Los Angeles County is so saturated with
knowledge of the incident, so influenced by the political controversy sur-
242. Minority group advocates in Los Angeles have long complained of the discriminatory
and brutal treatment by the LAPD towards the minority population. See COMMISSION, supra
note 174, at 70. Furthermore, official recognition of discriminatory treatment of minorities has
existed since the report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots of August
1965. Ia (quoting report's finding that "'a deep and longstanding schism between a substan-
tial portion of the Negro community and the Police Department'" exists). However, these
charges have been largely ignored by the Caucasian population. For example, but for the
videotape of Rodney King's encounter with the LAPD, it is unlikely that this incident would
have been investigated. See id at 9-11 (detailing Paul King's, Rodney King's brother, and
George Holliday's frustrated attempts to report incident to police).
243. 5 JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 49.05, at 2235-36 (2d
ed. 1969).
244. See Powell v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. App. 3d 785, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1991).
245. Id. at 796-97, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84.
246. Id at 803, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
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rounding the matter and so permeated with preconceived opinions that
potential jurors cannot try the case solely upon the evidence presented in
the courtroom."2 47
The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the
"right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the [s]tate and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.""24 However, due
to the notoriety of the accused's alleged crime, the defendant may believe
it would be impossible to receive a fair trial in the constitutionally man-
dated "district. ' 249 Upon a showing of a "reasonable likelihood" of prej-
udice, the defendant has a constitutional right to a change of venue.250
Both the right and the ability to waive this right are examples of point
nine of the rule of law definition-the incorporation of principles of natu-
ral justice into tribunals.
Change of venue is a mechanism designed to keep a system con-
forming to the rule of law ideal. It recognizes that merely empaneling a
jury or holding an open trial is not enough to guarantee an impartial
tribunal. In fact, these mechanisms of fairness sometimes produce the
opposite result. Justice is hardly served by subjecting a defendant to the
wrath of an angry community. However, once the decision to change
venue has been reached, what factors, consistent with rule of law values,
should be considered to determine the new venue?
Current law gives scant guidance. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure state: "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and
in the interest of justice, the court upon motion of the defendant may
transfer the proceeding .... ,,251 Although California also recognizes the
defendant's right to change of venue, 25 2 the current statutes provide no
guidance on how to choose the new venue. Instead, an administrative
code sets forth the procedure. 2 3 Like federal law, institutional and party
247. Id at 802, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
248. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
249. A defendant has the burden of proving prejudice due to media coverage or a hostile
courtroom environment in order to prove his or her Sixth Amendment right has been violated.
See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-01 (1975). In making its determination, the court is
to apply a totality-of-circumstances standard. Id. at 799. In Powell, the court considered the
following material factors in making its determination: "the size of the potential jury pool, the
nature and extent of the publicity, the status of the accused and the victim, the nature and
gravity of the offense, and the existing political turmoil arising from the incident." Powell, 232
Cal. App. 3d at 794-95, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
250. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966).
251. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b).
252. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1033, 1034 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
253. CAL. R. Cr. 842.
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convenience seem to be the priorities considered in pursuit of the "inter-
est of justice."2 4
The right to a fair trial belongs to the defendant, not the victim or
the people.255 Consequently, if an unprejudiced jury can be obtained in
the new community, and the new location is relatively convenient for the
parties, witnesses, and the court, then the legal system will find that the
interests of justice-that is, the interests of the defendant-have been
served.256 Under current venue law, broader concerns, such as the par-
ticular community's social values or sense of injustice, are irrelevant.25 7
This is a strange result considering that the jury is supposed to represent
the "conscience of the community."
2. The conscience of the community
According to Walker's comprehensive definition, trial by jury is not
an essential component of a rule of law system.25 8 In the United States,
however, it holds a prominent and revered position.25 9 An impartial jury
system supports several rule of law values. It ensures that the laws re-
main reasonably consistent with public opinion (point four); enhances a
tribunal's impartiality (point nine); and is vital to the nurturing of an
254. See id. Specifically, the California rule provides:
Upon being advised the [Administrative Director of the Courts] shall, in order to
expedite judicial business and equalize the work of judges, suggest a court or courts
that would not be unduly burdened by the trial of the case. Thereafter, the court in
which the case is pending shall transfer the case to a proper court as it determines to
be in the interest of justice.
Id.
255. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 21 "provides for a change of venue only on
defendant's motion and does not extend the same right to the prosecution, since the defendant
has a constitutional right." FED. R. CraM. P. 21 advisory committee's note 3; see Laurie L.
Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1533, 1540
n.34 (1993) (citing case law examples). However, a recent California ballot initiative that
passed in June 1990, the "Victim's Justice Reform Act" (Proposition 115), may give the prose-
cution a "due process right" to a fair trial in criminal cases, and hence, to a change of venue.
See id. at 1557-58.
256. Levenson, supra note 255, at 1542.
257. Id. Professor Levenson states that current change-of-venue law is based on three as-
sumptions: (1) "that the prosecution can obtain justice in any venue that provides a fair,
untainted trial"; (2) "that the prosecution has no constitutional right to a particular location or
jury pool"; and (3) "that trial courts are equipped and inclined to discern what will serve 'the
interest of justice' in selecting a new location for trial." Id. at 1543 (emphasis added). These
assumptions assume away any societal interests in justice being done for the injured
community.
258. The requirement of jury trial is absent from Walker's comprehensive definition. See
supra part II.D.
259. An estimated 80% of "all jury trials worldwide take place in the United States." VA-
LERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 31 (1986).
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attitude of legality (point twelve). The jury serves these values by fimc-
tioning as the "conscience of the community."26
Public participation in the trial process adds legitimacy to the pro-
ceedings.2 6 1 This is particularly important in criminal trials where the
state exercises its full coercive power against the individual.262 Addition-
ally, participation of citizens in the jury system legitimizes the govern-
ment by enhancing the feeling that the "government and the people [are]
in touch with each other. '263 Furthermore, as the standard-bearer of
community values, the jury acts as a barrier to prosecutorial and judicial
excess. 2 This is accomplished by injecting "community standards...
into the legal system to guard against possible harshness, arbitrariness, or
inaccuracy." '265 In light of these factors, the attitude of legality (point
twelve) is promoted by the use of the jury.
When a court grants a change of venue, a definitional problem
arises. How is community to be defined? Constitutionally, legally, and
by historic practice, community is defined geographically as the "dis-
trict," usually the county, in which the crime occurred.266 This narrow
geographic denotation of community not only has lead to "anomalies of
260. "[Ihe jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at more
than logic." United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969). Andrew Hamilton, the
Philadelphia lawyer who in 1735 defended printer John Peter Zenger on trial for seditious
libel, defined the idea in these words: "Jurymen are to see with their own eyes, to hear with
their own ears, and to make use of their own consciences and understandings, in judging of the
lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects." HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 259, at 35. But
see Levenson, supra note 255, at 1551 ("[T]his phrase is frequently used, it is infrequently
defined." (footnote omitted)).
Professor Levenson articulates just how the three rule of law values are supported by the
proper functioning of the jury as a conscience of the community.
At its essence, the phrase identifies a key role of the jury-to serve as a democratic
watchdog in the judicial decision-making process [point four]. It establishes a means
for popular participation in the administration of justice [points four and twelve]....
In order for a jury verdict to be accepted by the community and serve its role as a
symbol of peaceful and satisfactory resolution of the case [point nine], the verdict
must comport with community standards [points four and twelve]."
Id. at 1551-52 (footnotes omitted).
261. See Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
168, 188-201 (1972).
262. See Levenson, supra note 255, at 1551-52.
263. Scheflin, supra note 261, at 190.
264. See Levenson, supra note 255, at 1557.
265. Harold A. McDougall, III, Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 531
(1970).
266. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 259, at 28-29.
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justice, ' ' 267  but is counter to the common human associational
definition.268
If community is more a definition of people than places, does it
make rational or intuitive sense to believe that any one community in
modem America is a mirror image of any other? Perhaps in a homoge-
neous society "community" can be defined by metes and bounds.269
Whether characterized as the great "melting pot"-a fusion of many into
one-or "salad bowl"-a mixture of the separate but equal-the United
States prides itself on being "a nation of immigrants. ' 270 Yet despite the
historic fact of cultural diversity, federal and California law regarding
change of venue seems to presume that all communities are alike because
they do not require judicial consideration of differences among citizens
who comprise the particular "district in which the crime was
committed."
3. The conscience of Simi Valley
On remand from the appellate court, the trial court was compelled
to choose a new venue for the four officers pursuant to California Rule of
267. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 259, at 28-29. For example, in England, as late as
1536, "[d]ue to quirks of ancient surveying practices," if a crime was committed on "certain
roads, bays, creeks and harbors" that were not geographically located in any county, the de-
fendant was not entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 29.
268. As an example of the common, everyday understanding, refer to New Webster's Dic-
tionary of the English Language, which defines "community" as:
The state of being held in common; common possession, enjoyment, liability, etc.;
common character; agreement... life in association with others; the social state; a
number of individuals associated together by fact of residence in the same locality, or
of subjection to the same laws and regulations; a number of persons having common
ties or interests and living in the same locality ....
NEw WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 140, at 204 (emphasis added). Even in the field of
sociology, community is defined in terms of human association.
Originally the term community denoted a collectivity of people who occupied a geo-
graphical area; people who were together engaged in economic and political activities
and who essentially constituted a self-governing social unit with some common val-
ues and experiencing feelings of belonging to one another.... [Today] [clommunity,
although less all-inclusive, and slightly more specific in connotation, may be regarded
as denoting a community of interests.
A NEw DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 31 (1979).
269. Is it fair to characterize any society as truly homogeneous? Often societies of predomi-
nantly one race, such as Finland, Japan, Sweden, or even England, are considered homogene-
ous. However, economic, educational, or occupational differences can have a fundamental
impact on an individual's experience and emotional memory, and hence, his or her perception
of things. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; see infra notes 365-69 and accompany-
ing text. Consider, whether ajury of coal miners from Newcastle would necessarily respond to
the case of a poor man stealing a loaf of bread for his sister's child in the same way a jury of
financial analysts from Bond Street would.
270. See Andrew R. Cecil, Introduction to A MELTING POT OR A NATION OF MINORITIES
11 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1986).
January 1994] RULE OF LAW
Court 842.271 The Administrative Director suggested that the trial be
moved to Alameda, Riverside, or Ventura County.272 The prosecution
argued for Alameda County, which has racial diversity similar to that
found in Los Angeles County.273 Deciding that the move would be too
costly and time consuming for the participants, the judge decided to vest
the "conscience of the community" in Simi Valley.274
Simi Valley, located in Ventura County, is a predominantly Cauca-
sian, middle-class community of 100,000.275 Ventura County is 66%
Caucasian and 2% African-American, compared to Los Angeles
County's 41% Caucasian and 11% African-American populations.276
Ventura County boasts of being one of the safest urban counties in
America; Simi Valley is home to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
and the place to which "many members of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment have fled.",277 From this venire, a nearly all-Anglo jury was
eventually selected.2 7' Following weeks of televised proceedings, the jury
deliberated six days. The verdict: Not Guilty.279
C. The Disturbance
The perpetrators are not the good people of this city, not the law
abiding citizens of any community of Los Angeles. They are the
hoodlums who are destroying, who are trashing, who are burn-
ing, and who are killing.280
271. See supra note 254.
272. Levenson, supra note 255, at 1544.
273. Id
274. Id
275. Id at 1534 n.5.
276. Id. at 1537 n.23. Even more disparate are the specific demographic numbers for Simi
Valley: 80% Anglo, 13% Hispanic, 1.5% African-American, 5% Asian, and 0.5% American
Indian. Daryl Kelley, The King Case Aftermath, L.A. TIMS (Ventura County ed.),May 3,
1992, at B1.
277. Levenson, supra note 255, at 1537 n.23.
278. The actual racial make-up of the jury was 10 caucasians, one Latina and one Asian.
Edward J. Boyer, Williams Denies Hitting Denny, Urges Gang Peace, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17,
1993, at Al, A3.
279. The jury acquitted Sergeant Koon and Officers Powell, Briseno, and Wind of felony
assault charges and charges relating to filing false reports. The jury hung on the charge against
Powell, who delivered the most blows, for felony assault under color of authority. Richard A.
Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 Acquitted in King Beating, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at
Al.
280. The Capital Gang: Who Was Rioting in LA.? (CNN television broadcast, May 2,
1992) available in LExIs, Nexis Library, Script File [hereinafter Capital Gang] (statement of
Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley).
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Don't put it all on criminal elements. Some people are just fed
up. Across this nation black people are crying out for justice and
that must be answered.281
1. Legitimate rebellion or poetic injustice
On April 29, 1992, within hours of the verdict, violence erupted.282
At the intersection of Florence and Normandie Boulevards, angry Afri-
can-Americans pulled innocent drivers from their cars and beat them
mercilessly. 283 The vicious attack by four black men on a lone, white
truck driver was televised live to a shocked populace caught in the throes
of a nightmarish d6jA vu. 284 In another part of the city, protesters at-
tacked the federal court building and police headquarters.28 5 The
LAPD, unprepared for the backlash, retreated, regrouped, and awaited
orders from an already fatally wounded leadership.286 Meanwhile, the
city burned.287
It burned for three days. More than 5000 buildings were damaged
or destroyed; fifty-eight people died and thousands were injured. 288 It
was the costliest civil disorder in United States history, totaling nearly
one billion dollars.289 In the aftermath some African-American leaders,
such as Congresswoman Maxine Waters, were criticized for justifying the
civil unrest.2 9° Other public figures, such as Police Chief Daryl Gates,
281. Id (statement of National Executive Director of NAACP Benjamin Hooks).
282. Serrano & Wilkinson, supra note 279, at Al.
283. Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler, Rioters Set Fire, Loot Stores: 4 Reported Dead, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al.
284. See Laurie Becklund & Stephanie Chavez, Beaten Driver a Searing Image of Mob Cru-
elty, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al.
285. Lacey & Hubler, supra note 283, at A21.
286. David Freed & Ted Rohrlich, LAPD Slow in Coping with Wave of Unrest, L.A. TIMES,
May 1, 1992, at Al, All.
287. "Smoke was so thick in South Los Angeles that the Federal Aviation Authority or-
dered the rerouting of ffights into Los Angeles International Airport." Lacey & Hubler, supra
note 283, at A21.
288. Douglas Jehl & Frederick M. Muir, Bush Arrives in LA., Calls for Healing, L.A.
TIMES, May 7, 1992, at Al, A6.
289. Thomas S. Mulligan, Insurance Claims Will Hit $775 Million, L.A. TIMES, May 21,
1992, at Dl.
290. See News: Derelict Police Response to Rioting Hot Topic in LA. (CNN television
broadcast, May 5, 1992) available in LExis, Nexis Library, Script File (statement of Ms. Ezola
Foster, spokesperson for Black Americans for Family Values).
Oh, I think Mayor Bradley, certainly, if not half, most of the blame for this should go
on him. There's no question about it. Even the church at which he met with the
community leaders, all of the elected officials-Congresswoman Maxine Waters,
State Assembly Person Diane Watson-publicly stated that America would see the
worst riots that we had ever had if those four white police officers were not found
guilty.
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were quick to condemn the events as the mere criminal opportunism of
hooligans.291
How should one interpret the disturbance that occurred after the
verdict was returned? Was it "private" mass coercion, and thus, con-
trary to all rule of law ideals? Or was it a genuine act of civil disobedi-
ence? And if the latter, is it reconcilable with the rule of law?
2. Civil disobedience and the rule of law
The rule of law works only if the citizens maintain an attitude of
legality.292 This attitude manifests itself by fidelity to the law--citizens
habitually obeying or having a tendency to habitually obey the law. The
twelve points of the rule of law doctrine are the substantive and proce-
dural characteristics that will help ensure public fidelity to the law. If
respect for the law is justified, then how can active, intentional disregard
for the rule of law ever be tolerated?
Professor Rawls's answer to this issue' is instructive. Professor
Rawls defines civil disobedience as a type of political communication: It
is "a public, nonviolent, and conscientious act contrary to law usually
done with the intent to bring about a change in the policies or laws of the
government."293 He contends that civil disobedience can play a vital role
in a democratic society that is "nearly just."294 It "address[es] the sense
of justice of the majority and... serve[s] fair notice that in one's sincere
and considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation are being vio-
lated."'2 9 In this respect, civil disobedience is a manifestation of the pro-
phylactic function of the attitude of legality.
Professor Rawls proposes three reasonable conditions that would
justify resorting to civil disobedience. 296 First, civil disobedience should
Id.; see Capital Gang, supra note 280; Evans & Novak (CNN television broadcast, May 2,
1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File; Nightline: Stop the Madness (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, May 1, 1992) available in LExis, Nexis Library, Script File.
291. Phil Mintz & Jim Mulvaney, LA. Nightmare, NEWSDAY, May 1, 1992, at 5 (quoting
Daryl Gates as saying "'A bunch of hooligans have gone out and looted and burned this
city' "); see John L. Mitchell, NAACP Official Stands by Controversial Remarks, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1993, at B1; Capital Gang, supra note 280.
292. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 41.
293. Rawls, supra note 163, at 246.
294. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 382. A "nearly just" society "implies that it has some form
of democratic government, although serious injustices may nevertheless exist." Id. In a nearly
just society, "the principles of justice are for the most part publicly recognized as the funda-
mental terms of willing cooperation among free and equal persons." Id.
295. Id at 382-83 (emphasis added).
296. Id at 371-74. He admits, however, that these conditions are not exhaustive. Id. at
375.
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only be directed at serious infringements on the principles of justice.2 97
Accordingly, civil disobedience should only be resorted to when the
"principle of equal liberty" or "principle of fair equality of opportunity"
is blatantly violated.298 Second, it should be a last resort, engaged after
all lawful courses have been explored and proven nonresponsive.299
Third, it should be undertaken only after due consideration is given to
the natural duty to justice and the restraint that this duty imposes on all
human action."° This last condition is meant to limit the scope of the
civil disobedience so that it does not lead to the "breakdown in the re-
spect for law and the constitution, thereby setting in motion conse-
quences unfortunate for all."30 1 The danger of civil disobedience that
goes too far is that the protesting minority risks distorting its appeal to a
sense of justice, and thereby losing majority support or engendering
harsh retaliation.3"2 Thus, the "effectiveness of civil disobedience as a
form of protest declines beyond a certain point; and those contemplating
it must consider these restraints. '30 3
These conditions imply that civil disobedience ends somewhere near
where acts of violence begin. Professor Rawls's notion of civil disobedi-
ence does not include any acts of violence.304 He believes that true civil
disobedience is inherently nonviolent because "it is a form of speech, an
expression of conviction. ' 3 5 Although nonviolent civil disobedience has
had many revered and successful adherents, 30 6 some commentators criti-
cize absolute distinctions that preclude all violent acts.3 7 It is under-
297. Id at 371-72.
298. Id at 372.
299. Id at 373. Note that "[t]his condition is, however, a presumption. Some cases may
be so extreme that there may be no duty to use first only legal means of political opposition."
Id
300. Id at 373-74.
301. Id. at 374. One interesting, but arguably unrealistic, solution to the problem of exces-
sive civil disobedience is Professor Rawls's suggestion that minorities who want to engage in
civil disobedience form a "cooperative political alliance" in order to keep the level of civil
disruption to a constitutionally tolerable level. Id "They can meet their duty to democratic
institutions by coordinating their actions so that while each has an opportunity to exercise its
right, the limits on the degree of civil disobedience are not exceeded." Id. at 375.
302. See id at 374.
303. Id.
304. See Rawls, supra note 163, at 246.
305. Id. at 247.
306. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in CIVIL Diso-
BEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 163, at 72; Harris Woford, Jr., Non-Violence
and the Law: The Law Needs Help, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 163, at 59.
307. See generally ZIrN, supra note 54, at 39-53 (stating that violence should not be ruled
out as means if it leads to nonviolent end).
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standable why Professor Rawls would have trouble with violent acts. To
take another's life violates the first fundamental principle of justice-
equal liberty. Conversely, mere infringement of one's equal liberty by
another cannot justify completely extinguishing the equal liberty of an-
other by taking his or her life. Lesser, but still serious, infringements of
liberty-such as inflicting bodily harm or destruction of personal prop-
erty-are also viewed, and rightly so, as criminal acts, not acts of civil
disobedience.
Targeted destruction of public property identified as being the
source or symbol of injustice, however, may be a politically justified ex-
pression of convictions, and hence, an act of civil disobedience. Here an
institution is attacked, not another individual's person or property.
Within certain extremely narrow limits, then, the rule of law can be
served by politically justified acts of civil disobedience, even if those acts
lead to destruction of property. These acts, however, can be justified only
if directed at public property, and only when it is conducted in a manner
that will not pose a serious threat of harm to an individual's life or other
liberty interest. For example, spilling blood on draft records, although
destroying public property, could be a legitimate form political protest
against a war and hence an act of civil disobedience. Using a car bomb to
blow up a court house, however, is not civil disobedience; it is a criminal
act. In the first example, no person was likely to be harmed by the vio-
lence; however, use of explosives in a public place-even with prior
warning-creates too high a risk of human injury to be an acceptable
form of protest under a rule of law system that is suppose to protect
equal liberty.
Justified civil disobedience does provide a valuable service to the
rule of law. As a politically legitimate "bad" attitude of legality, it sends
the message that the legal and social order have serious problems. Thus,
legitimate civil disobedience provides citizen feedback, advising the sys-
tem to reconfigure and adjust to the needs of the people.
3. An interpretation of events
It is hard to view the civil unrest following the verdicts as anything
but a riot. The vast majority of the violence was committed against indi-
viduals and private property; much of that violence was specifically di-
rected at nonAfrican-American persons and nonAfrican-American-
owned property. Drivers passing through South Central Los Angeles at
the wrong time, Korean-owned neighborhood stores, corporate retail and
food outlets, and small businesses and manufacturers were all subject to
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the mob's rage."' Any political motive that may have initially stirred
the public's anger was quickly consumed by a passion for revenge.30 9
These acts were acts of criminal anarchy.310 Anarchy, riot, the law-
less rule of the mob-all are antithetical to the rule of law, and thus,
cannot function in a rule of law system.311 Anarchy is the manifestation
of an attitude of illegality, a lex talionis writ large, a might-makes-right
street justice. This attitude cannot work in a rule of law system that
must be sensitive to diversity of experience and the fact of pluralism, 312
where the close proximity of reasonable yet incompatible interests and
beliefs will regularly produce tension. Individuals expect and rely on the
legal order to provide mechanisms that either prevent or remedy harms
that result from this social tension in a balanced manner that leads to
repose. A jurisprudence of anarchy produces neither protection nor rem-
edy, balance nor repose; it fosters only dominance, manipulation, and
terror.
A few isolated incidents occurring during the rioting might at first
appear justified as civil disobedience. The property damage done to the
federal courts building and police headquarters might arguably be viewed
as protests against the legal system itself-symbolic acts of defiance di-
rected at a legal order that no longer produces equal justice under the
law. The cry "No Justice, No Peace' 313 might fairly summarize the feel-
ing of social injustice behind these acts.
After applying Rawls's prerequisites to these acts in conjunction
with this Comment's strict limits on any acts of violence, however, these
destructive protests cannot be justified as civil disobedience. Turning to
the Rawlsian criteria, these acts meet only the two of the three require-
ments. First, the protest was legitimately raised against a very serious
infringement of equal liberty-African-Americans were receiving une-
qual treatment under the law. Second, after more than a year of legal
maneuvering and commission reports, it was reasonable for many to
think that all the legal avenues had been exhausted. At the time of the
308. See, eg., Tina Griego, 2 Cities-Under Siege and Under Threat, L.A. TIMES, May 1,
1992, at BI, B6; Lacey & Hubler, supra note 283, at A21.
309. Shortly after the verdicts came down, "[a]bout 200 people lined the intersection [of
71st and Normandie], many with raised fists. Chunks of asphalt and concrete were thrown at
cars.
Some yelled, 'It's a black thing.' Others shouted, 'This is for Rodney King.'" Lacey &
Hubler, supra note 283, at A21.
310. See Mitchell, supra note 291, at B3.
311. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 24.
312. See supra note 94.
313. Jenifer Warren & Martha Groves, Verdicts Spark Protests, Violence Across California,
L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A3, A24.
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civil unrest, there was no guarantee that a federal trial was still a possibil-
ity, or any faith it could result in a just verdict.314
Justification of these acts fails, however, on the third prong of the
Rawlsian inquiry. Nothing indicates that these acts were undertaken
only after due consideration of the duty to justice and the restraint that
this duty imposes on human action. Had this consideration occurred,
the leaders of these protests - assuming there were any-would proba-
bly not have engaged in these acts at this time. Since these acts only
fueled the criminal violence already occurring at other locations, these
additional acts of violence could only lead to the net negative result of
which Rawls warned: a distortion of the appeal to justice being made to
the majority. Additionally, because of their cumulative violent effect and
apparent lack of forethought, these violent acts were undertaken in a
manner that serious harm to human life was likely. Hence, the property
damage to the federal courts building and police headquarters cannot be
justified under the strict limits by which violent acts against public prop-
erty can sometimes be legitimate civil disobedience.
Although the civil unrest following the verdict is not civil disobedi-
ence, a valuable political message can still be found by sifting through the
rubble. This kind of intense, widespread violence does not occur in a
vacuum. The absence of an attitude of legality in a significant number of
citizens puts society on notice that the rule of law ideal is in serious
trouble. The moral of the story: Don't kill the message because you
don't like the messenger.
IV. THE LEssoNs LEARNED
I'm mad. Everybody should be mad. How did this trial ever
manage to take place before a jury with no blacks? And, despite
this, why were the jurors unable to see right from wrong? Don't
white folks believe in God? Don't they believe injustice? After
all, they're the ones who created the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. 
315
The rule of law has been in a state of emergency in Los Angeles
since the spring 1992. 316 The failure of the state prosecution gave rise to
314. See Nightline: The Rodney King Verdict (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 29, 1992)
available in LExIs, Nexis Library, Script File (statement of Congresswoman Maxine Waters).
315. Terry McMillan, This is America, N.Y. TiMES, May 1, 1992, at A35.
316. See Mitchell, supra note 291, at B3 (quoting head of Los Angeles NAACP, Joseph H.
Duff: "'There is a tremendous amount of distrust in the community when it comes to criminal
justice and the rule of law.' "); see also Miles Corwin, Police Officers Find Their Task Increas-
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federal indictments.317 Some perceived the federal trial of the four of-
ficers as finally ensuring justice, while others criticized it as being a politi-
cally motivated sacrifice of the officers to an angry mob.318 Regardless,
the city and nation breathed a collective sigh of relief at the baby-split-
ting of the federal trial jury's verdicts.31 "9 This split decision may have
avoided more rioting, but it does not offer lasting solutions to problems
rife in the legal system.
In fact, retrying the officers on substantially the same criminal of-
fense is in itself fraught with rule of law issues. Can a jury in a city
ravaged by riots from the first trial be truly impartial fearing that re-
newed rioting will follow if the "wrong" verdict is reached? This could
be a violation of point nine in the rule of law definition: the requirement
of impartial tribunals. Is the dual sovereignty doctrine 320 an adequate
justification for overriding the fairness concerns of double jeopardy when
the prosecution's case may be more politically than legally sound? This
might be a violation of point three: the requirement that substantive law
have the characteristics of generality, certainty, publicity, and equality.
ingly Perilous, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at Al, A24 (reporting on dramatic rise in violent
assaults against officers). "The officers on the street have noticed a definite change in atmos-
phere since the riots .... The alarming number of officers being fired on at random is some-
thing new. And, overall, there's just more confrontation, more challenging the authority of
officers on a nightly basis."' Id. at A24 (quoting LAPD Captain Jim Tatreau).
317. See Newton, supra note 234, at 10.
318. See, eg., Mike Davis, New King Trial Starts, but Old Troubles Remain, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1992, at Ml; Start of New King Trial, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at M4 (publishing
letters to editor from David Beckman, Francis Megahy, Lillian Spencer, Anthony J. Bradisse,
and James Underdown).
319. Sergeant Koon and Officer Powell were found guilty, Officers Briseno and Wind not
guilty. Newton, supra note 234, at 35. However, in some circles, those sighs of relief turned
into shouts of anger after the judge, using his discretion to circumvent a mandatory seven-to-
nine year sentence, handed down two-and-one-half-year sentences to both Sergeant Koon and
Officer Powell. See Anthony Duignan-Cabrera & Michael Connelly, Sentencings Reopen
L.A.'s Painful Wounds, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1993, at Al; Kevin Johnson, 5 King Jurors Criti-
cize Sentences, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al; Jim Newton, Koon, Powell Get 2 1/2 Years in
Prison, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at Al; Jerome H. Skolnick, Perspective on the King Case,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at B7. In "a rare interview," Judge John G. Davies, the federal
district court judge who presided over the federal trial, publicly defended his reasons for im-
posing the sentence he did on the defendants. Jim Newton, Judge Defends Powell, Koon
Sentences as Fair, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at Al.
320. "The 'dual sovereignty doctrine' provides another exception to the double jeopardy bar
against retrial. This doctrine allows the federal government and a state government, or two
state governments, to bring successive prosecutions for offenses arising from the same criminal
act." Project, Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992, 81 GEo. L.J. 853, 1249-51 (1993). The Supreme
Court established the dual sovereignty doctrine in the context of the federal-state prosecutions
in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); in the state-state context, the relevant case is
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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Or should concerns for the defendants' fair trial rights be secondary
when there is greater social good from reaching the "right" result? The
result causes tension between point one-substantive laws must protect
against (mass) private coercion-and point four-mechanisms must exist
so that content of law is consistent with social values. These concerns
are substantial, yet beyond the scope of this Comment's analysis. They
do, however, illustrate that once a rule of law system suffers a serious
hemorrhage, a patchwork approach to repairing the problem leads to fur-
ther deterioration.
For any real change to result from the incident, some hard lessons
need to be learned. This Comment will briefly discuss three: (1) A rule
of law system cannot operate in accordance with the values of equality,
impartiality, and fairness if it imposes its coercive force disproportion-
ately on particular groups within the society; (2) the traditional police
"professional" or "command and control" model can aggravate feelings
of unequal treatment and should be replaced with a community-based
police system; and (3) because of the diversity of experience and fact of
pluralism in modem American society, any legal definition of "commu-
nity" for change of venue purposes must be based on human associations,
determined, in large part, by demographic statistics.
A. The Damage Done by Discriminatory Effect
A single verdict did not ignite the explosion of rage that racked Los
Angeles, nor can a single verdict extinguish the still smoldering resent-
ment. For the African-American community in Los Angeles, many links
in the chain of injustice led to the disturbance.32 For instance, in March
1991--earlier in the same month that Rodney King encountered the
LAPD-a Los Angeles Superior Court judge gave probation, a $500 fine,
and 400 hours of community service to a Korean grocer who shot and
killed an African-American teenager over a punch in the face and a bot-
tle of orange juice.3 22 The California Supreme Court let stand the sen-
tence, declining to review the case. 23 The seeming injustice of this
sentence was further underscored by the sentence in another case, de-
cided five days after the sentencing of the Korean grocer, where a man
received a thirty-day jail sentence for beating a dog.324 Additionally,
321. See Understanding the Riots Part 1: The Path to Fury, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at
TI ("exploring the deep roots of the disorder") [hereinafter The Path to Fury].
322. See Philip Hager, Justices Uphold Karlin's Ruling in Slaying of Latasha Harlins, L.A.
TIMES, July 17, 1992, at Bi.
323. Id.
324. The Path to Fury, supra note 321, at TI 1.
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critics charge that the local county court system smacks of informal
apartheid, where a seemingly "whites-only" bench sentences predomi-
nantly minority defendants. 25 Finally, the Independent Commission,
empaneled after the Rodney King incident, confirmed what had long
been felt by the African-American as well as other minority communi-
ties: Pervasive and systemic racism exists in the LAPD.326 Moreover,
strong evidence was uncovered that suggested use of excessive force was
directly related to the suspect's race.
32 7
Consider also that the rage over the perceived injustice of the verdict
was not confined to the Los Angeles city limits, but reverberated
throughout the country.32 The problem of disproportionate impact of
the criminal justice system on African-Americans is national in scope.
For instance, a 1990 study of the federal and state criminal justice sys-
tems reported that twenty-five percent of African-American males be-
tween the ages of twenty and twenty-nine were in the custody or control
of the criminal justice system.329 The criminal justice system's coercive
power does not fall disproportionately only on African-Americans; gen-
erally, people of color are subject to its discriminatory effect. A July
1992 report of the American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Mi-
norities in the Justice System, which conducted a national bias study,
emphatically stated that
our justice system treats minorities inequitably and . . . past
efforts to eliminate bias and promote diversity, although well
intentioned, have fallen considerably short of their goals.
Much needs to be done.., to inaugurate a new national effort
to better promote "equal justice" in the United States.
330
Can a legal system that adversely impacts a particular class, or
classes, of its citizens truly serve rule of law ideals? Referring to the
comprehensive model, one can see that de facto discrimination violates
several rule of law values. For example, because the law's coercive effect
325. Charles L. Linder, Judicial L.A.: South Africa Without the Formality, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1993, at Ml, M6. There are no African-American superior court judges in seven of
the 10 Los Angeles County judicial districts. Id. In the county's central district, which has a
large minority population, there is only one African-American judge out of 34. Id.
326. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 69-93 (detailing LAPD's long history of racism, as
well as gender and sexual orientation bias).
327. Id. at 69-70.
328. See Chris Black & Jolie Solomon, Voices Raised in Aftermath of Verdict, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 2, 1992, at 1.
329. Jonathan Marshal, How Our War on Drugs Shattered the Cities, WASH. POST, May 17,
1992, at Cl.
330. ABA TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES & JUSTICE Sys., ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN A Di-
VERSE AMERICA 1-2 (July 1992) [hereinafter ABA].
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falls so harshly on particular groups, serious questions are raised about
the substantive law's equality and generality-the point-three rule of law
value. Is the substantive law implicitly directed at control of minority
populations?"3 ' Or, if the substantive laws are fair, are the enforcement
mechanisms of the system being exercised in a way that perverts the
equality and generality of the laws? 3 3 2 Excessive force and racism by the
police force, combined with the racially motivated use of prosecutorial
discretion in bringing charges and plea bargaining, violates several rule of
law values: Discretionary powers of the government are not exercised in
an impartial, honest way (point eleven); the government is acting above
the law (point two); and government action is escaping meaningful over-
sight (point six). Furthermore, minorities' inability to receive justice in
the courts violates points nine-impartial tribunals-and ten-equal ac-
cess to the courts.333 The discussion below identifies two problems with
enforcement mechanisms and suggests alternative approaches.
The most pervasive damage done, however, by the legal system's
discriminatory effects concerns the attitude of legality. Even those not
directly subject to its adverse impact experience an uncomfortable feeling
that something is wrong. It is counterintuitive to believe the rule of law
ideal is embodied in a legal system that produces such disproportionately
discriminatory consequences. Thus, the legal order is generally suspect,
the attitude of legality begins to erode, and an attitude of lawlessness and
self-help fills the void.
This corrosive impact is not confined to the affected minority com-
munities. Frustration with the legal system is palpable in the public
housing projects of Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, as well as in the
331. One of the recommendations of the ABA report on minorities and the justice system
calls for a review of "seemingly race-neutral legislation" for "unintended but nevertheless ra-
cially biased outcomes" resulting from its enforcement. Id. at 14. As an example the report
cites a 1992 Minnesota Supreme Court decision that struck down state sentencing provisions
because they violated African-Americans' rights to equal protection under the law. Id (citing
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1992)). The sentencing provisions mandated longer
prison terms for individuals convicted of crack cocaine possession-92% of whom were Afri-
can-American-than individuals possessing cocaine in powder form-85% of whom were
Caucasian. Idi
332. See COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 69-93 (discussing racial, ethnic, and gender bias
on LAPD); see also ABA, supra note 330, at 10-14 (reporting not only possible bias in police
departments, but in district attorneys' offices as well).
333. Both the denial of minorities' entitlement to equal access to the civil courts and the
adverse treatment of minority defendants in the criminal courts are major issues addressed in
ABA, supra note 330, at 14-24.
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privately policed enclaves of Lake Forest, Gross Pointe, and Bel Air.334
Consequently, there is increasing lawlessness manifest in all sectors of
society-from "gangbangers" to "S&L" officers. 335 Therefore, in order
to benefit all citizens, the legal system should be examined and revised,
thereby restoring the attitude of legality.
B. Community Policing
One way to address the discriminatory effect of the legal system on
minorities is to reevaluate one of its enforcement mechanisms, the police
force. The traditional form of police operations is known as the "profes-
sional" model.336 The purpose of this model is to develop a paramilitary
team of officers able to respond with speed and force to quell criminal
disturbances in the community.33 The philosophy behind this type of
policing is simply to put away the bad guys. 338 The popularity of this
type of policing stems from its success in reducing police corruption, im-
334. This frustration sometimes finds expression in the violence of a riot, see supra part
III.C., sometimes in the quiet, private armament and barricading of individuals in their homes,
see Jill Smolowe, Danger in the Safety Zone, TIME, Aug. 23, 1993, at 29, 32.
335. See, eg., MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY (1990); William
K. Knoedelseder, Jr., Better Known for Hollywood and Beaches, Southern California is Also
Considered the White Collar Crime Capital of the United States, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1989, at
D5; Karen Tumulty, U.S. Crime Rate Dips but Violent Offenses Climb, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1993, at Al; Henry Weinstein, Financial Scams Are on Rise in Region, L.A. TIMES, June 23,
1993, at D1; see also Smolowe, supra note 334, at 29 (reporting on rise in violent crime in small
towns and suburbs, and in locations once thought safe havens, such as hospitals and court-
houses).
Although anecdotal, this eyewitness report of looting that occurred during the April 1992
disturbance is a microcosm of the wide spread problem of lawlessness in society at large.
The looters who broke the window and went in first were black. The next waves
were not what [Silverton Peel] expected. It wasn't just that they were white. It was
what they were driving-two or three BMWs, a white Cadillac, a Jeep, a school bus.
A school bus? The bus driver stopped, got out, grabbed a few things, loaded them
onto the bus and took off.
Just up the street, at La Brea and Beverly, Samy's Camera was broken into
about the same time. Six or seven black men shot at the lock with what sounded like
an automatic weapon, but the looters who followed were mostly white kids. One guy
was driving a Lexus. One kid was wearing a yarmulke. Finally, someone torched
the building.
The Path to Fury, supra note 321, at T12.
336. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 97. This type of policing is also referred to as the
command and control model. See George L. Kelling et al., Police Accountability and Commu-
nity Policing, PERSP. ON POLICING, Nov. 1988, at 2-3.
337. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 97. "A 'professional' model of policing is primarily
concerned with maintaining a well-disciplined, highly trained, and technically sophisticated
force insulated from improper political influence." Id.; see Kelling et al., supra note 336, at 2.
338. COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 97.
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proving the qualifications and training of officers, standardizing proce-
dures, and establishing intraforce unity.
339
Police operations in Los Angeles, at the time of the Rodney King
incident, employed the professional model. 314  From a crime-fighting per-
spective, this manner of policing had been effective.341 Thus, a relatively
small police force-8450 officers policing a city of more than 3.4 mil-
lion 34 2 -had been able to confront a rising violent crime rate more than
twice the national average.343 As a result, the LAPD had developed "a
reputation as a hard working, car-based mobile strike force that is tough
on criminals. '344 Police techniques pioneered by the LAPD include the
use of SWAT teams, helicopters, and a motorized battering ram.345
There is a downside to this mode of policing. It tends to inculcate
members of the police force with an "us versus them" siege mentality.
346
The professional model emphasizes "crime control over crime prevention
and isolate[s] the police from the communities and the people they
serve." 347 Consequently, the police consider residents living in high-
crime areas as potential criminals, instead of possible victims; in turn,
those people fear, resent, and distrust the police "command presence. "348
The Independent Commission found that the police culture created by
339. Kelling et al., supra note 336, at 2.
340. CoMMtssIoN, supra note 174, at 97.
341. Of the police departments in the six largest cities in the United States-New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, and Philadelphia-the LAPD had the highest average
number of violent and property crime arrests. Id at 23. In 1986, this worked out to 3.1
violent crime arrests per officer and 4.4 property crime arrests per officer. Id
342. Id at 21-22. In 1986 LAPD officers were the busiest in the nation. Id at 23. During
that year, 9.2 violent crimes and 35.2 property crimes were recorded for each sworn officer.
Id
343. Id
344. Id
345. Id
346. See id at 98. As one ex-police officer, now a minister, described it: The "'problem
transcends cultural differences. The police department divides everybody into two categories:
blue and everyone else."' Id at 99-100.
347. Id at 98.
348. See id at 99-100.
Routine stops of young African-American and Latino males, seemingly without
"probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion," may be part and parcel of the LAPD's
aggressive style of policing. The practice, however, breeds resentment and hostility
among those who are its targets. Moreover, the practice has created a feeling among
many in Los Angeles' minority communities that certain parts of the City are closed
to them or that being detained by the police is the price of traveling in those areas.
Id at 77.
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the professional model was responsible, in part, for the LAPD's systemic
racism and rising brutality.349
An alternative and growing trend in police operations is the concept
of "community policing."'35 This model is based on the premise that the
police force's primary purpose is to prevent crime, and the best way to do
that is by sharing responsibility with the people in a community.351 It is
an "interactive process between the police and community to mutually
identify and resolve community problems." 35 2 The concept of commu-
nity policing
envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime
and disorder and concerned with, and sensitive to, the quality
of life in the community. It perceives the community as an
agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a pas-
sive audience. This is in contrast to the traditional concept of
policing that measures its successes chiefly through response
times, the number of calls handled, and detection rates for seri-
ous crime.353
Community policing is "a philosophy of policing that contains sev-
eral interrelated components. 354 Three key components are: (1) articu-
lation of policing values that incorporate citizen input regarding the
quality of life in the neighborhood; (2) police accountability to each com-
munity's list of unique concerns, desires, and priorities; and (3) power
sharing that encourages active citizen involvement in police efforts to
prevent and solve crimes.355
Referring to Walker's twelve-point definition, it becomes clear that
community policing is a system of law enforcement that incorporates and
promotes several rule of law values. First, a mature community policing
system will include an extralegal mechanism that subjects police action
349. See generally iL at 69-82 (detailing "nexus between racial and ethnic bias and the use
of excessive force" by LAPD).
350. On April 16, 1991, the chiefs of 10 major metropolitan police departments issued a
position paper endorsing community policing. Id at 104.
351. Id at 100-01. For a practical and detailed discussion of the community policing
model, see generally NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1992 (entire issue devoted to topic of commu-
nity policing).
352. Lee P. Brown, Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials, PERSP. ON
POLICING, Sept. 1989, at 7 (emphasis omitted).
353. Malcolm K. Sparrow, Implementing Community Policing, PERSP. ON POLICING, Nov.
1988, at 1-2.
354. Brown, supra note 352, at 5.
355. Id. There are thirteen interrelated components outlined in this article, many of which
involve the internal departmental reorganization that must occur for community policing to be
implemented. Id at 5-7. For the purposes of this Comment, these three have the most bearing
on rule of law values.
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to oversight by the community (point six). Because police will be ac-
countable to the community, this facet should ensure that the legal sys-
tem's enforcement mechanism better comports with local social values
(point four). Furthermore, because the police must incorporate commu-
nity values, the discretionary powers of the police will more likely be
used in honest and impartial ways (point eleven). It is hard to abuse
people with whom one shares a set of beliefs and values; it is easier to
abuse people who are perceived as having interests adverse to or different
than one's own.35 6
Finally, the power sharing feature of community policing will bene-
fit the attitude of legality (point twelve). From the public's perspective,
law enforcement would no longer be something external, imposed by the
government upon the community. Instead, the law becomes something
internal to the community---controlled and implemented by the commu-
nity for its own safety and security.357 Additionally, community policing
should improve the police officers' attitude of legality. From their per-
spective, community policing fosters greater citizen support, shared re-
sponsibility for crime prevention, and greater job satisfaction. 358 Thus, a
police officer in a community-policing system will be less likely to feel
frustrated with the legal system, and therefore, unlikely to resort to the
type of "street justice" doled out to Rodney King.
C. Redefining Community for Change of Venue Law
For the jury to fulfill its rule of law role as the "conscience of the
community," the venue resulting from a change of venue request should
be required to approximate the mix of citizens residing in the community
in which the crime occurred. As discussed earlier, merely defining a
community by geographical boundaries, and not by the individuals, will
not fulfill this requirement.35 9 In fact, failure to define "community" by
its members may conflict with United States Supreme Court decisions
that recognize a community's interest in a fair trial. The Court has long
held that safeguards must be implemented in order to ensure that all
members of a community have an opportunity to be included in the ve-
nire.3' Recent decisions have gone even further, recognizing that the
356. See COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 105 (stating that community policing "should
have the effect of 'humanizing' officers' perceptions of those whom they police.").
357. See Brown, supra note 352, at 7-8.
358. Id. at 8.
359. See supra part III.B.2.
360. For the decision that required that the venire represent a cross section of the commu-
nity, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474
(1990) (reiterating constitutional mandate is for impartial jury and "fair-cross-section" venire
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community itself has an interest in how the jury is selected.361 By ensur-
ing access to the jury selection process to all citizens regardless of race,
the Court has expressly noted that "the rule of law will be
strengthened." '362
Implicit in the rationale of these decisions is the notion that racial
diversity has social value-value that should be reflected in the pool of
possible jurors. Far from revolutionary, the value of racial diversity has
already been expressly recognized in other areas of law.3 63 The need to
account for diversity is grounded, in part, on an intuitive understanding
that, in any given community, individuals of different races will experi-
ence and interpret life differently. 3 4 Empirical statistical analysis, how-
ever, strongly suggests that attitudes can be affected by more than just a
person's race.365 There are other factors-age, income, education, gen-
der, religion-that may have an equally significant impact.3 " Thus, to
helps guarantee that mandate); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (holding that
exclusion of persons on account of race is prohibited for grand jury selection); Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (holding that equal protection violation occurs when discriminatory
effect of seemingly neutral procedure keeps certain racial groups from being included in
venire).
361. "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system ofjustice." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); see also Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992):
The public, in general, continues to believe that the make up of juries can matter in
certain instances.... Major newspapers regularly note the number of whites and
blacks that sit on juries in important cases. Their editors and readers apparently
recognize that conscious and unconscious prejudice persists in our society and that it
may influence some juries. Common experience and common sense confirm this
understanding.
Id at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
362. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
363. Levenson, supra note 255, at 1565 (discussing Supreme Court decisions concerning
voting rights laws and efforts to expand minority-owned broadcast media).
364. As Justice Marshall wrote in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972):
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknow-
able. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a
class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspec-
tive on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented.
Id. at 503-04; see McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Common experi-
ence and common sense confirm this understanding.").
365. See, eg., SOURCEBOOK, supra note 171, at 125-218.
366. An example of this fact can be found in how groups of individuals responded to the
question, "Are there any situations you can imagine in which you would approve of a police-
man striking an adult male citizen?" Id at 182-83. In 1991, if the respondent was white, 70%
answered yes; if the respondent was black or other (nonwhite), 44% answered yes. Id. at 183.
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attain true community similarity, the newly selected venue must be likely
to produce a venire containing potential jurors with a similar mix of indi-
vidual characteristics as would have been found in the original commu-
nity. The question then becomes, what criteria should be employed by
courts to meet this objective?
Demographic statistical data provide objective information upon
which courts can make a reasoned determination of community similar-
ity. The federal government, via the national census, collects and dis-
seminates information regarding the race, ethnicity, age, income,
accumulated wealth, gender, and education of individuals on a county-
by-county basis. 67 Thus, communities can be deemed substantially simi-
lar if they conform statistically, within a reasonably close range, across a
number of census categories.368 In California, legislators have proposed
various bills that would define community for change of venue purposes
by using this type of information.369 In addition, at least one state court
has endorsed this approach-albeit in dicta.
370
Granted, problems arise when attempting to conform to a strict
formula that equates demographics with diversity of experience and atti-
tude. Professor Laurie Levenson, in her recent article on change of
venue, identifies two major concerns. First, "demographics are not nec-
essarily reliable indicators of the community's values"; second, relying
solely upon demographics risks institutionalizing stereotypes. 371 There is
a real danger in treating groups of people-all African-Americans, all
women, all college-educated individuals-as a monolith. The same intui-
tive understanding that calls for an account of diversity cautions against
assuming that similar external characteristics mandate unity of thought
and feeling. A recent example of this is evident in the acquittal of three
white LAPD officers-who were involved in a bungled drug raid that
caused serious damage to African-American-owned property-by a Los
But even more dramatic was the split between those respondents with annual incomes of
$15,000 and more (72% answered yes) and those with annual incomes of $5000 to $6999 (36%
answered yes). Id Additionally, educational differences created more of a statistical divide
than race: 73% of college-educated respondents answered yes, but only 36% of grade-school
educated respondents answered yes. Id Gender, religion, occupation, and political affiliation
all made a significant difference, though not as significant as race. Id This exercise under-
scores the value of taking multiple demographic factors into account in shaping the "con-
science of community."
367. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: SUBJECT INDEX
TO CURRENT POPULATION REPORT (1991).
368. See Levenson, supra note 255, at 1561.
369. Id at 1538 n.25, 1544-45 (discussing pending legislation in California).
370. People v. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604, 608 (N.Y. 1976).
371. Levenson, supra note 255, at 1567.
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Angeles jury, half of whom were African-Americans.3 7 2 Moreover,
merely finding that a community has similar demographics is not enough
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial because that community
may also be unduly prejudiced against that defendant.3 73 Therefore, Pro-
fessor Levenson suggests that demographics should be a factor in, but
not determinant of, the selection of a particular new venue. 4
From a rule of law perspective, the demographic approach is sound
and should be a significant factor when considering a change of venue
determination. This approach recognizes the fact of pluralism3 7 and di-
versity's impact on experience, which forms, in part, an individual's per-
ceptions. If a jury more closely resembles the mix of experiences
encountered by diverse groups in a society, then the jury will serve as a
mechanism for ensuring that the substantive law comports with public
opinion (point four). Finally, if the legal system ignores the fact of plu-
ralism,376 as well as diversity of experience, then it risks losing legiti-
macy, impartiality, and public acceptance, which are all necessary to
maintain the rule of law. Hence, the attitude of legality (point twelve) is
likely to be absent, and the criminal justice system seriously undermined.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to believe that the American people are so naive to
believe because you may see an American flag in our courtrooms
that we are guaranteed justice. The majority of trial lawyers,
with the help of most judges, have made our courts "courts of
law" and not "courts ofjustice. " The complacency of the popu-
lace has permitted this change.377
The above quotation makes a disturbing implication: To apply the
law is to frustrate justice. Law is no longer a conduit but an obstacle to
justice; lawyers and judges are in a conspiracy to obfuscate justice
through the subterfuge of law. The author of the above quotation might
believe that "the rule of law" is really the "tyranny of rules."
In evaluating systems of formal justice, how a system reacts and
responds to the public's perception of justice is of great concern. The
372. See Terry Pristin & David Ferrell, 3 Officers Acquitted in 39th-Dalton Drug Raid,
L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at Al.
373. Id.
374. Levenson, supra note 255, at 1567.
375. See supra note 94.
376. See supra note 94.
377. Tom P. Simovich, Letters to the Times, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1993, at B6. The head-
line on the letter was simply "Justice."
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essential nature of the attitude of legality to a rule of law system should
now be apparent. The public's perceptions of a particular decision will
be based largely on how it perceives-intuitively, emotionally, and ra-
tionally-the system as a whole. If favorably perceived, even a particular
decision generally considered to be "wrong" will not dislodge the pub-
lic's respect for the system. Yet when a particular decision reverberates
through the entire social order, causing the type of destruction that fol-
lowed the verdicts in the first trial, to consider it as nothing more than
the reaction of "bad" people is to court disaster. The bond between ben-
eficiary and fiduciary is broken; the feedback is deafening.
This Comment does not claim that by adopting the modest propos-
als articulated in part IV, the rule of law will be completely rehabilitated.
Community policing will not miraculously eradicate decades-old hostil-
ity between police and minority communities, nor will it prevent all fu-
ture incidents of police brutality. Furthermore, even if the jury pool had
been composed of a diverse mix of citizens, the jury itself still may have
been all white, or, if racially mixed, may still have found the officers not
guilty. Moreover, merely changing venue based on demographically
driven factors might not have prevented riots from breaking out in re-
sponse to a "not guilty" verdict. These suggested changes, however, cou-
pled with the other "working" parts of a legal system that embody rule of
law values can serve as a beginning to the revisions necessary for a re-
newal of the society's legal order. Such rebirth may create a rule of law
system that the public can intuitively and rationally believe offers equal
justice under the law.
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